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INTRODUCTION

As an instniment of government, the Articles of Confederation
was one of the most advanced of its time.

With great care it separ

ated local powers from those of general character.

It provided dual

authority; the states were sovereign in their sphere and the Congress
sovereign in its national realm.

Article II provided that "Each State

retains its sovereignty, freedom, and Independence, and every Power,
jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."^

These powers

expressly delegated to the national sphere were: the exclusive power
of determining peace and war; sending and receiving ambassadors, enter
ing into treaties and alliances; establishing courts of equity and
admiralty (Congress itself was the last court of appeals for disputes
between states or citizens); regulating the currency; establishing post
offices; appointing all officers of land and sea forces; and determin
ing the requisitions of each state for paying off the national debt
through a common treasury.

The Confederation provided freedom of

movement for its citizens, and national citizenship.

Under the Arti

cles of Confederation each individual held the same freedoms as another.
Article IV states unequivocably, "... and the people of each state
shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other state, and

^Winton U. Solberg (ed.), "The Articles of Confederation," The
Federal Convention ^d the Formation of the Unioxi (Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merrill Comply-,
p. k2.
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2
shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject
to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants

2

thereof respectively."

In print it was a national government setting

up a national treasury, national citizenship, and a national debt.
Article XII provided that "all bills of credit emitted, monies borrowed
and debts contracted by, or under the authority of congress, before the
assembling of the united states, in pursuance of the present confedera
tion, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the imited
states, for pajmient and satisfaction whereof the said united states,
and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged."-^

It cannot be

doubted that in these instances the Articles of Confederation was a
national government.
The provision for regulating voting has been considered one of
the flaws of the Confederation.

Article V declared that delegates were

to be annually elected, "in such a manner as the legislature of each
state shall direct."

They were also subject to recall any time the

state demanded, and the delegates could be replaced by others.

By

mathematical deduction it is easy to conclude that each state would
soon run out of competent delegates to fill the annual requirement.
But the stipulation that "no person shall be capable of being a dele
gate for more than three years in any term of six yearsallowed a
delegate to be re-elected if he was considered competent.

It is also

worthy to note that in the state debates over the Constitution, the
Antifederalists feared the number of years a senator was allowed to
hold office.

Such a long temi in office would change the Senate into

2lbid.. p. ii3.

hbid., p. 50.

^Ibid., p. k3'
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"a rich man's club," more concerned with the rich than with the poor.
Meanwhile, the Continental Congress only lacked delegates because the
states often did not send any at all—even before they had exhausted
their supply.

Secondly, those most competent to govern returned again

and again to fulfill the duties a deferent society placed in their
keeping.
Another flaw was in the stipulation that each state had only one
vote and a majority of states—nine—must agree before legislation
could become law.

Moreover, all thirteen states had to agree on an

amendment before it could be effective.
taken up in detail.

These "flaws" shall later be

Here it is only necessary to mention them as po

tential defects in an instrument that in theory was efficient.

Article

XIII solidified the Confederation by declaring that "Every state shall
abide by the dsterminations of the united states in congress assembled,
on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them."^
The Articles of Confederation provided for a unified, comprehensive,
well-balanced government.

Because the delegates of the Continental

Congress strictly limited their power, these "flaws"became a subject of
criticism for historians»

Had the powers of the Confederation been

broadly interpreted these "flaws" would never have become paramount nor
even visible to the critical eye of contemporary historians blessed
only with the insipid faculty of hindsight.
Almost from the beginning the Articles of Confederation met with
dissatisfaction from critics.

To name the more prominent, James Madison,

Alexander Hamilton and George Washington found the Articles defective.

^Ibid., p. 51.
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After the Federal Convention, the exaltation of the Constitution became
the fetish and the Articles of Confederation was consigned to the rub
bish pile.

Historians took up the theme which the Founding Fathers had

set to harp music.

William Henry Prescott, in his Diplomatic History

of the Administrations of Washington and Adams, published in 1857> found
the time between the peace of I783 and the adoption of the Constitution
in 1788 "the most critical period of the country's history."

John

Fiske, in The Critical Period of American History, 1783-1789, took up
Prescott's theme and farther hammered at the Articles' defects.

Andrew

McLaughlin, although finding the Articles of Confederation in some
aspects honorable, in The Confederation and the Constitution, could not
condone its impotence,^
Charles A. Beard, in M Economic Interpretation of the Constitu
tion, upset the myth of the Constitution's infallibility.

Writing as

a Progressive historian. Beard's original intention was to prove the
Constitution less democratic and more autocratic than what the people
believed.

Beard distinguished, in his Economic Interpretation of the

Constitution, between two leading types of propertied interest—land
and commerceo

Commercial property was strongly represented in the Con

stitutional Convention; landed property was represented by those opposed
to the Constitution.

Despite intense opposition in certain states, the

Constitution was ratified, but this ratification was not a true repre
sentation of the people.

He based this argument on the prevalence of

property qualifications for suffrage, which meant that only a minority

%ichard B. Morris, "The Confederation and the Constitution,"
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, XIII (April, 1956), 139-156.

of freeholders and other owners of property could participate in elec
tions to the ratifying conventions.

As a consequence the ratifying

conventions were not truly representative.

In short, there was a clash

between the mercantile and landed interests, with the mercantile inter
ests coming out on top because of the power conferred by their economic
advantages.

The Founding Fathers were, mainly, man of the aristocracy,

or men holding commercial property.
7
the protection of this "elite".
Constitution was shattered.

The Constitution was founded for

The great, uncanny hallowness of the

Historians took up Beard's interpretation

and rewrote and reiterated it AD NAUSEAM.
Merrill Jensen also tried to discredit the Constitution.

He

argued that the Federalist party was organized to destroy the kind of
democratic government made possible by the Articles of Confederation.
The Articles of Confederation mirrored the true expression of democracy
and the ideals set forth in the Declaration of Independence.
stitution was a betrayal of these principles.

The Con

The Articles of Confed

eration was designed to prevent the central government from infringing
upon the rights of the states, whereas the Constitution was designed to
check both the states, and the democracy that found expression within
O
state boundaries.
Examining the Confederation period, Jensen found
that "the history of the period too often is written in terras of the
shrill cries of politicians who were seldom easy when in office and who

"^Charles A^ Beard, ^ Economic Interpretation of the Constitution
of the United States (New York? Macmillan Company, 1913)•
^Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederations An Interpretation
of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution, IYTU1781 (Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 19l|.8)o

6
prophesied doom when their opponents won elections."^

In this period

there was not gloomy pessimism but an " exaberant optimism" everywhere.
Instead of being a "critical period" in American history, the Confeder
ation was a constructive period during which the national debt was
reduced, commerce began to prosper, and manufactures were encouraged.^®
Forrest McDonald, Robert Brown and Lee Benson headed the van
guard of reaction against Beard.
McDonald's.

The most devastating attack was

Examining the actual tax records of the states, McDonald

found that Beard had never studied the economic holdings of all ratify
ing conventions.

No voting patterns by the states were found to conform

to Beard's thesis of personalty—there was no split in the ratifying
conventions between those who owned property and those of the commercial
interests,^^

Robert Brown attacked Beard's methodology.

He fourd that

Beard had examined the economic holdings in I780 and 1790 and not
during the ratifying convention itself.

Beard further distorted the

picture by confining himself to the big states' fights and not probing
into the motivations of small states.

Brown concluded by asserting

that the whole colonial society was democratic and not aristocratic.
Lee Benson re-interpreted Beard's book.

12

Both Beard and his critics

had failed to understand the difference between an "economic interpre
tation".and "economic determinism".

What Beard had actually done in

Q
Merrill Jensen, The New Nation; A History of the United States
During the Confederation, 1781-1789 (New York; Knopf, 19^0), p. 87.
^Qlbid.
^Forrest McDonald, We the People; The Economic Origins of the
Constitution (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1958).
l^Robert Eldon Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitutions A
Critical Analysis of. "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution"
JPrinceton: University of Princeton Press, 1956).

7
his study was to utilize economic determinism, but since such a method
had not yet been distinguished as a special method of analysis. Beard
did not identify it as such.

Brown and McDonald both erred when they

undertook to disprove Beard by using an economic interpretation.

Benson

took Beard's economic determinism and applied it to a social interpreta
tion.

Through his social interpretation he re-affirmed Beard's economic

statement—'the crux of the conflict lay in the social clash between the
commercial and agrarian elements of society.^3
The reaction against Beard and Jensen brought a renewed assertion
of the Constitution's value and the Confederation's defects.

However,

the reaction against Beard never quite swung back to the post-Federal
Convention adulation.

J, Ro Pole, in his article "Historians and the

Problems of Early American Democracy,expressed the important idea
that institutions should not be viewed through modern concepts of demo
cracy.

The concept of democracy in the twentieth century cannot be

applied to the eighteenth century.

"The idea that the great mass of

the common people might actually have given their consent to the con
cepts of government that limited their participation in ways completely
at variance with the principles of modern democracy" adumbrate contem
porary judgments.

Furthermore, the colonial and the early national

periods were pervaded "by a belief in and a sense of propriety of social
order guided and strengthened by the principles of dignity on the one
hand and deference on the other.

1^
It was ... a deferential society."

^^Lee Benson, Turner and Beards American Historical Writing
Reconsidered (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, I960).
Ro Pole, "Historians and the Problems of Early American
Democracy," American Historical Review, LXVII (1962), 6k^.
^^Ibid., p. 6kS.
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To argue which government was more democratic—the Constitution or the
Confederation-—is irrelevant.

Pole suggests an even more important

points in examining an instrument of government, its "defects" must be
considered in the light of the concepts of the time.

The attitude of

the people toward government, and the competence of those who were
selected to govern, must be evaluated apropos the instrument of govern
ment.
This thesis explains the failure of the Articles of Confederation
by examining the actions of those who governed, and the motivations of
those who refused to be governed.

The overriding focus is placed on the

people and not the instrument of government.

It is the contention of

this thesis that any instrument of government must be judged, not on a
mechanical basis, but with an eye on the men who operated that instil
ment and the mass of people who were affected by the policies of those
men,

A great many of the failures of the Articles resulted from the

narrow vision of the Continental delegates, and the strict construction
by which they limited the government created for the needs—no matter
what those needs may be-—of the people.

All government, after all,

requires men to mold it into what it shall become.

If the delegates

had been more confident of government, perhaps the government would
have proved itself steadfast.

If the people had found their delegates

strong, perhaps they would have respected government.
confidence, and, conversely, fear breeds fear.
all those under it.

Confidence breeds

A government influences

Disrespect cannot remain isolated in such cases.

What begins at the top percolates downward until the entire nation is
touched.

The delegates' timidity affected the government; the govern

ment affected the people.

9
Had the delegates broadly interpreted the Articles of Confedera
tion many of the "flaws" would be non-existent.

As will later be shown,

there were attempts to interpret broadly the Articles of Confederation,
but these attempts failed.

The "flaw" of Article IX, that no congres

sional resolution could become law "unless nine states assent to the
same," was seen by the broad constructionalists as meaning a majority
of nine, which would be five states.

Had Article IX been interpreted

thus many congressional resolutions that failed would have become law.
A case in point was the five per cent impost which failed because only
eight states approved the measure.

Very often, then, the question of

the efficiency of the Articles of Confederation rests upon how narrowly
the delegates construed these clauses.
In the early period of the Revolution the Continental Congress
held the respect of the people.

But as the Revolution lengthened into

years and the timidity and ineptitude of the congressional body became
more manifest, this respect dissolved into a general contempt.

By 178?

the manifestations of this were shown in the general anarchy of the
times.

People openly disregarded the mandates of Congress, and self-

interest completely overcame any altruistic feelings the people might
have felt in the embryonic stages of national government.
It will be shown in this thesis that many of the criticisms
modem historians have levelled against the Articles of Confederation
were not due to faulty government.

The troubles that arose out of the

Confederation period were due in large part to the attitude held by all
people toward government; the inept and timid delegates who governed
only with reluctance.

Secondly, many of the mechanical difficulties.

-10such as the unprepared state of the country for a large war, the prob
lems of finance, and the inexperience of a country just recently separ
ated from the British colonial empire, were elements that no government
—-newly instituted—could have met.

CHAPTER I

A BRIEF SURVEY OF HUMAN NATURE

This chapter tries merely to demonstrate, by a few choice exam
ples, the Introduction's assertions.

The writer has selected specific,

and prominent, examples of men—from Congress, the military, and business
—to further emphasize a point.

Selfishness, pride and greed often were

prevalent in the body politic and in the military.

The concern for

their own private interests far over-shadowed any national interest they
held.
Those who governed were all too often more concerned with their
own dignity than with the dignity of the nation.
Thomas Burke of North Carolina.

A case in point is

One fine evening Burke left the Congress

in a huff and a messenger was sent to retrieve him.

Burke replied,

rudely, "Devil take me if I will come; it is too late and too unreason
able."

As befitted a body representing the national sovereignty, the

intractable member the next day was called up before Congress and
charged with breach of order.

When asked if he could defend his con

duct, Burke replied in the affirmative.

He admitted that he had "in a

manner" invoked the name of the Devil in his reply to the messenger,
but insisted that he was guilty of no rudeness to Congress, for Congress
was then adjourned.

When Congress adjourned it "ceased to be a body."

He declined, therefore, to make any apology.
over its members anyway?

"What power has Congress

If he had been guilty of misbehavior, he would

11
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answer to his own state.Congress merely proved that it could not
control its own members, and one member at least showed that he was
quite capable of reducing dignity to a travesty.
Personal honor instead of national honor very often was the con
cern of military officers.

Major-General John Sullivan was subjected

to criticism of his ability in the Continental Congress.

Critical

remarks were not taken gracefully by Major-General Sullivan.

In fact,

in the correspondence of John Sullivan a large portion of his letters
concern his egocentric preoccupation with these "smears" on his honor.
George Washington was impelled finally to write a letter pleading with
him to disregard such disparaging remarks, many of which were imaginary.
Do not, my dear General Sullivan, torment yourself any longer
with imaginary slights and involve others in the perplexities
you feel on that score. No other officer of rank in the whole
army has so often conceived himself neglected, slighted, and ill
treated as you have done, and none I am sure has had less cause
than yourself to entertain such ideas. Mere accidents, things
which have occurred in the common course of service, have been
considered by you as designed affronts.2
The Deane-Lee controversy that began in Europe succeeded in find
ing its way into the august halls of Congress.
to disrupt and divide Congress while it lasted.

This controversy managed
Silas Deane had been

sent to Hirope on official United States business.

While there he man

aged to involve himself in several shady business deals.
and his nephew, Thomas Morris, were also involved.

Robert Morris

Deane had made an

implacable enemy of Arthur Lee, the third commissioner at Paris.

Arthur

^Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress (New York: Macmillan Company, 19l4.l)> p. 298.
^Otis G. Hammond (ed.). Letters and Papers of Major-General John
Sullivan (3 vols.; Concord: New Hampshire Historical Society, 1939),
II, 3.687
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Lee and his brother, William Lee, were determined to expose the corrup
tion in the American agency at Nantes, where Thomas Morris was in charge
of operations.

Morris kept all his papers relating to his commercial

agency in a strong box.
papers.

Upon his death, William Lee confiscated these

Benjamin Franklin had befriended Silas Deane and was involved

to a certain extent in Deane's business dealings.

When charged, Deane

and Franklin defended their actions as vigorously as the Lees attacked
them.

The rupture among the American commissioners was soon complete.

Everyone connected with the government service in Europe was forced to
take sides.

"Nourished by factionalism, the squabble in Europe assumed

the dimensions of a major political trial which divided Congress into
hostile camps and precipitated a struggle for control.

Charges and

countercharges crossed the Atlantic, reinforcing lines of division
already existing."^

The Lees were on the side of the "Adams-Lee junto"

which had long opposed Robert Morris, John Dickinson, and the Living
stons.

"To the proud and influential Lee family, the ascendance of

Robert Morris and Benjamin Franklin marked a drift of power into un
friendly hands.He promptly requested a hearing, but feeling ran so
high that Congress could not decide to proceed with his examination.
He was kept waiting for months while his accusers held the floor.

Fin

ally he published his side of the case in a Philadelphia newspaper, and
the whole controversy spilled into print.
to plague Congress until August, 1779-

The Deane affair continued

Congress was able to discover

^E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse (Chapel Hill: Univer
sity of North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 9it.
^Ibid., p. 95.

1h

several business irregularities, bat not imich could actually be proved.
Under such circumstances all that Congress could do was to refuse to
grant Deane's claim for commissions and give him leave to depart.
The Deane affair had unsavory aspects, and its results were
destmctive. It laid bare to public view the selfish bickering
that disgraced American service abroad; at one point a commit
tee of Congress listed the offenses of which each of the foreign
commissioners had been accused and suggested that all of them
be recalled. Neither Arthur Lee nor anyone else gained credit
for his part in it. At home, the controversy excited the deep
est animosities without resulting in any important administra
tive reforms or constructive alterations in the balance of power
in Congress. The rancor it left was for years the underlying
basis of Congressional division on questions which might better
have been considered on their own merits.5
While a majority of Americans sympathized with the "patriotic
cause," only a small minority were actively interested and ready to
sacrifice their material comfort for an ideal.
staunch loyalists.

A large number were

Added to this number were those who were overly

fond of the good things of life and not anxious about the success of
either the patriots or the loyalists.

They sold their produce for Brit

ish money, while the American array starved.

After the sWolution these

groups—minus those loyalists who had fled the country—welded themselves
into a general body of selfish inertia.
proved frustrating.

Attempting to tax such a body

As Robert Morris pointed out to Benjamin Franklin;

"The people are undoubtedly able to pay, but they have easily persuaded
themselves into a conviction of their own inability, and in a govern
ment like ours the belief creates the thing.The people were not
destitute.

There is abundant evidence to show that at the end of the

^Ibid., p. IOI4..
^Andrew Cunningham McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Consti
tution (New York; Haiper & Brothers, 1905), p. 69.
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Revolution people were living with more ease and circumstance than before
the war.

If nothing else, Merrill Jensen, in The New Nation. shows that

7
prosperity was evident, if not organized.

The trouble was not poverty

but commercial confusion, and a native disinclination to pay taxes.
Charles Thompson of Virginia described the scenes
The population is increasing, new houses building, new lands
clearing, new settlements forming, and new manufactures estab
lishing with a rapidity beyond conception, and what is more,
the people are well clad, well fed, and well housed. Yet I
will not say that they are contented. The merchants are com
plaining that trade is dull, the farmers that wheat and other
produce are falling, the landlords that rent is lowering, the
speculists and extravagant that they are compelled to pay their
debts, and the idle and the vain that they cannot live at others'
cost and gratify their pride with articles of luxury,°
The American Revolution was the incubator of the defects com
plained about in the Confederation, and they were in turn the product of
popular reactions and political cowardice.

In the early days of the

In examining the Confederation period, Merrill Jensen finds that
although the "New Nation" was predominantly agrarian, the farmers de
pended upon the shippers to export their produce to Europe and the West
Indies. The farmers' prosperity was linked to the prosperity of the
merchants and shippers. The merchants and shippers that exported and
bought these products in turn found prosperity in depreciating currency
since prices rose as a consequence. "They bought goods and held them
while prices went up." After the Revolution westward expansion and
the growth of cities were added evidence of prosperity. "War itself
was partly responsible for the new growth. Merchants from smaller
towns moved into larger ones and rapidly took the place of Loyalist
merchants who had left." The newly won independence also produced
growth in manufacturing, banking, and new markets for exportation.
There might have been restrictions on trade by various national gov
ernments, but "... only one conclusion can be drawn regarding the
paths of commerce in the eighteenth centurys governments marked them
out by law but provided only the weakest means of enforcement. Mer
chants and shipoTmers followed the paths if they seemed profitable;
if not laws be damned. There is nothing in the knowable facts to
support the ancient myth of idle ships, stagnant commerce, and bank
rupt merchants in the new nation." Jensen, The New Nation, pp. 177-233.
"MacLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, p. 78.
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Confederation the prestige of the Continental Congress was high.

But

from the outset the members of Congress failed to utilize that prestige
to set up a government that worked efficiently, and with authority.
Why, then, should the people have confidence in a government afraid of
its own shadow?
spect.

Ineptitude and timidity breed only contempt, not re

For a government to act on its own tenets it must have delegates

who have faith in those tenets.

By the end of the Revolution the people

had found the Continental Congress wanting in all the characteristics
that instill respect.

The Confederation fell, not through the weakness

of its structure, but through the weakness of those men who were to
uphold that structure.
The Revolutionary War was undertaken without adequate preparation,
and handicapped by a general shortage of funds.

The national government

of the Confederation has been found contemptible in the eyes of contem
poraries.

The states ignored its requisitional demands, and it was

incapable of enforcing these demands.

It has somehow been overlooked,

however, that the states were as poor as the national government.

Most

often the states were incapable of meeting the requisitional demands.
Instead of ignoring Congress, they were as impotent as Congress in try
ing to meet the expenses of a major war without the financial basis to
do so.

CHAPTER II

BETTER "IN THE RED" THAN DEAD

A chief criticism of the Articles of Confederation concerns its
lack of coercive powers.^

As a consequence of this defect taxation

proved difficult, if not impossible.
full quotas on requisitions.

The states rarely produced their

The problem, however, did not result or

even start with the Confederation.

An early source of irritation between

the colonies and the mother country concerned paper currency.

The use

of paper money was a solution to the problem created by a shortage of
coin and the absence of banking institutions.

As E. James Ferguson

points out, all hard money brought in by commerce flowed outward in the
purchase of British commodities.
An undeveloped country, America could not produce enough to
buy goods needed for its economic development; more was always
imported than American cargoes of tobacco, wheat, furs, and
naval supplies could procure; hence an unfavorable balance of
trade with Britain,^

^The lack of coercive powers was a constant complaint among
politicians of the time. George Washington incessantly lamented the
inability of Congress to enforce its resolutions. James Madison,
Alexainder Hamilton, Robert Morris, John Sullivan—to name the more
prominent—found congressional impotencB a matter of continual concern.
The Founding Fathers, quick to justify the newly instituted Constitu
tion, pointed to the coercive powers of the new government as a means
of greater efficiency. Historians, such as John Fiske, William Henry
Prascott, George Bancroft, and Andrew MacLaughlin, found the Confeder
ation inadequate and the Constitution a decided improvement. Their
justification for this position inevitably brought out the Confedera
tion's impotence in the face of state opposition. "No power to enforce,
merely to request" constantly was the argument used to demonstrate the
Constitution's merits and the Confederation's great flaw. To the
Founding Fathers and the early historians of the period, such impo
tence was the cause for all the evils of mismanagement and disobedience.

2

Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 1;.
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The flow of hard money was toward Britain rather than America.

Hard

money in America was more of a "commodity" than a medium of exchange.
There were no banks to enlarge the money supply by employing the avail
able specie to back a paper medium.

During the colonial era, the legis

latures of each colony printed paper money as needed to meet war expend
itures.

The legislative acts which authorized these emissions almost

always assigned specific taxes for their redemption.

If import duties

produced about five thousand pounds a year, the income for four years
ahead was allocated to redeem twenty thousand in bills of credit.^
Taxes for years ahead were appropriated to withdraw money emitted in a
single year.

Begun in war, currency finance was then adapted to the

ordinary functions of government in time of peace.

In short, a basic

financial pattern emerges out of the colonial eras governments met ex
penses by issuing a paper medium directly to the people; they then
redeemed this paper—not by exchanging it with hard money—but by ac
cepting paper money for taxes or other payments.
That paper money had a tendency to be unstable did not bother
the colonists.

The sole test of currency was not its constancy of value.

Another criterion is suggested by Thomas Pownall, a New England merchant,
"it was never yet objected that depreciation injured them in trade.
One of the greatest merchants in America, Thomas Hancock, was not con
vinced that paper money was an unmitigated evil.

When Massachusetts

passed an act, putting it on a sound money basis, Hancock complained,
"This d—d Act has turn'd all Trade out of doors and it's impossible
to get debts in, either in Dollars or Province Bills."

^Ibid., p. 10.

^Ibid., p. 1^.

To an expanding

^Ibid.
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country whose people seldom had fixed incomes "it is possible that a
constant and continuing inflation was not entirely injurious."

During

the Revolution Americans, were merely pursuing a tradition "with no
thought of unorthodoxy or innovationo"

In colonial times their govern

ments had used "fiat" money; in fact, their "whole system of public
finance was based on it."^
The unfavorable balance of trade between the colonies and Great
Britain did not improve with independence.
sened.

To a great extent, it wor

With the Navigation Acts, the colonists had enjoyed lucrative

trade under the auspices of the British Crown; with independence this
disappeared.

Merrill Jensen makes the apt observation that while the

American merchants did not like the bonds of the Empire when a part of
it, "they had enjoyaci its privileges and after the war was over many
7
did not think they could survive without them."
The worsening condition of trade during the Revolution was a
matter of concern to Richard Henry Lee.

In 1776 he expressed his anxi

ety to Patrick Henry.
The War cannot long be prosecuted without Trade, nor can
Taxes be paid until we are enabled to sell our produce, which
cannot be the case without help of foreign ships, whilst our
enemy's navy is so superior to ours. A contraband sloop or so
may come from foreign parts, but no authorized, and conse
quently sufficiently extensive Trade will be carried on with
us whilst we remain in our present undefined tinmeaning condi
tion, o
Trade was further hampered by the confiscation of ships for war purposes.

6lbid.
"^Jensen, The New Nation, p. iShp
°James Curtis Ballagh (ed.), The Letters of Richard Henry Lee
(2 vols.; New York: Macmillan Company, 191U), I, 179.
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Thomas Thompson of Massachusetts wrote an irate letter to the Massachu
setts Committee of Safety complaining about the confiscation proceedings
against the ship Raleigho
All Privateers are stopped for the purpose of manning the
Continental Ships of War and filling up the army. The State of
Massachusetts Bay strictly keep to their first intention, inso
much that the same owners concerned in the Privateer now in
Portsmouth were obligated to bring two of their ships up from
the Castle, which had been victualled and manned some time and
ready for sea: they have petitioned and remonstrated to the
Council several times since urging the Damage and great expense
they have been at, but to no effect: they only received for
answer, the public good must be preferred to the private inter
est.9
Under normal conditions the money problem of the Confederation
would not have achieved such enormous proportions, but the Confederation
was forced to fight a war with very little specie.
paper money was the only way to finance the war.

The issuance of

Since any scheme to

support widespread military operations with thirteen state currencies
would have created insuperable difficulties, Congress adopted a Contin
ental currency.
redemption.

Congress pledged the faith of thirteen states to its

Each state was made responsible for the withdrawal of a

certain quota of the total emission.

Paper emissions required some

sort of balance between issuing and- withdrawing, but Congress had little
power to control either.

Because Congress could not control the expend

itures of war, nor effect the withdrawals of paper money, Continental
currency depreciated beyond control.

But Congress continued to print

money until its value was almost gone, convinced that the only alterna
tive was to abandon the war.

As the President of Congress put it, the

^Nathaniel Bouton (ed.), Documents and Records Relating to the
State of New Hampshire Daring the Period of the American Revolution,
from 1776-1783 (10 vols.; Concord: Edward A. Jenks, Printer, I87I4), VIII,
U83.
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Congress was convinced that "any quantity of brown paper would serve the
purpose.
If the Continental Congress found the states falling behind on
their requisitions it was often because the states did not have the money
either.

The states could levy taxes, but, as Benjamin Franklin observed,

they had not in the early years of the war "the Consistency for collect-

11

ing heavy taxes."

State governments were new-born and sometimes

wracked by internal disorder.

Their legality was not firmly entrenched,

and they were more concerned with gaining popular support than with
levying rigorous taxes.

Such rigorous taxation would also dangerously

suggest an onerous comparison with the enemy.
ments suffered from the general war.

Secondly, state govern

Normal incomes from import and

export duties were cut off, and it was hardly possible to lay taxes on
property when men were leaving their occupations to join the arrr^r.
Therefore, the states did not levy any taxes of significance in 1775

12
and 1776.

As Gouvemeur Morris declared, it would have been "madness."

By the time state governments were firmly entrenched and politi
cally able to collect taxes, all paper money—Continental as well as
state currency—had "gone into decline."

Before taxes could be col

lected, the income expected from them was eroded by depreciation.

State

governments could function only by issuing more quantities of paper
money, and with each new emission th^ realized less and less income.
"Unable to avoid spending every dollar they could lay their hands on,
they put Continental money back into circulation as fast as it came

^^Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 27.
^^Ibid., p. 30.

^^Ibld.. p. 31.
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into their treasuries.The obvious lack of money is evidenced in the
correspondence of the time.

In a letter to James Madison, Edmund Pen

dleton of Virginia wrote,
. . . the Executive, having an empty Treasury have circulated
a TequBst f?3r a prompt advance of half the land tax payable
some months hence for the purpose of recruiting our line. Our
country . . . appear to be willing to comply, but from convers
ing on the Subject with several gentlemen it is the general
opinion, that there is not in the country Specie sufficient to
pay one-fourth of that tax and I see no prospect of our being
able to pay it at the time.^^
David Jameson of Virginia wrote to Madison,
There is but little Specie in the State—not any in the
Tresury—and those whose services are required by the state,
will not take certificates, so that the meanest Goblar can now
obtain Credit where the state cannot. How humiliating! While
the tax payable in Tobacco continued in force, the state had
some Credit, but that being set aside we are now quite bankrupt.
I write this only to yourself.^5
The State Treasurer of Virginia, Jacquelin Ambler, was forced to write
a letter to James Madison explaining why Virginia was unable to pay
Madison's expenses at Philadelphia.

In exasperation he concluded the

letter, "It is in vain for the Assembly to pass resolution after reso
lution directing the Executive to make remittances, unless they will
put Means in their hands also."^^
The necessity for taxation was emphatically stated by MajorQeneral John Sullivan.

According to General Sullivan the prosperity

of the United States depended on resolutions of the assemblies "to

^^Ibid.
^William Hutchinson and William Rachel (eds.). The Papers of
James Madison, 1782 (5 vols.,* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
IV, 18U.
^^Ibid.. p. 176.

^^Ibid., p. 18^.
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proceed to tax the people, as deep as they can bare"; the only hurdle
to be overcome was convincing the people of "this Sacred Truth, that it
is in their Interest to pay high Taxes.But, as Richard Henry Lee
pointed out in a letter to John Adams, taxation was not the cure-all
for the chronic money problems.

". . .1 fear that the slow operation

of Taxes, which indeed are pretty considerably pushed in many States,
will not be adequate to the large emissions of paper money which the war
compels us to msike."^®
When it was found that the states could not meet requisitions by
paying money, in 1780 Congress adopted a general requisition asking
delivery of specific commodities such as beef, pork, flour and tobacco.
But during the jrear or two in which this kind of requisition operated,
it proved to be no more than a stopgap arrangement.

Without money for

purchasing, the states had to collect or seize the supplies from their
citizens.

Seizures of produce had to depend on the seasons, and deliv

eries to Congress were spasmodic rather than constant.

Frequently goods

were not ready in time and the quantity needed for the array could not
be obtained.
Morriss

The condition of the country was summed up well by Robert

"A Revolution, dissolution of government, creating of it anew,

cruelty, rapine, and devastation in the midst of our very bowels.

These,
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Sir, are circumstances by no means favorable to finance."
The disorder of finances is clearly portrayed in a New Hampshire
letter to the Continental Congress in 1782.

The Continental Congress

^"^Hammond, Letters of Ma.1or-General Sullivan, I, 366.
X8
Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, II, ij,06.
^^Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 25-
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had passed a resolution in March, 1780, requesting each state to call
in all the Continental currency.

Part of the money was collected, but

it was generally thought that "at the time which said Tax was granted
there was not half the Sum which was called for then in possession of
the Inhabitants of this State."

The state then passed an act for rais

ing the sum of 120,000 pounds for the support of the War and for defray
ing the charges of the state.

The people were allowed to pay the tax

in new bills or in Continental currency.

The Continental currency was

allowed for payment since it was unanimously assumed that "the whole
quantity of Continental Currency then in this State would not amount to
near the proportion assigned them by the Resolution of Congress."

But

New Hampshire had also asstimed that this resolution of Congress would
be complied with by all states.

The tax of 120,000 pounds was payable

at different periods, and while the tax was being collected Continraital
currency "depreciated rapidly" in the states to the South.

Large quan

tities of depreciated currency were pushed into New Hampshire and the
Treasury found itself with five million dollars over and above the pro
portion assigned it, "by which means the principal Intention of the
State in granting said Tax of 120,000 pounds was in a great measure
defeated, many debts which were determined to be discharged by said
Tax are now unpaid . . . and the State will be unable to pay any con20
siderable Sum to the United States."

An initially simple solution

resolved itself into a complicated dilemma.

After such "historical

facts" one can well understand Milton's meaning when he said, "Ify way
of joking is to tell the truth."

^^Bouton, Documents and Records of New Hampshire. X, 579.
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The Act that Gongress instituted in March, 1780, was an attempt
to issue new currency by revaluing the old currency.

Under this plan

Congress revalued the old Continental money at forty to one of specie.
The states were called upon to tax this money out of existence at a
rate of $1^,000,000 per month.

Their deliveries of the old currency to

Congress would release the new emission for use.

Forty dollars of the

old money, brought in, would release two dollars of the new money, of
which four-tenths would go to Congress and six-tenths to the state de-

21

livering the old.

The problem New Hampshire faced with an excess of old Continental
bills was largely due to the Congressional use of certificates.

Certif

icates were drafts which federal officers drew upon their respective
departments.

They were issued by all departments in place of money, but

the (^artermaster and Commissary departments used them in overwhelming
numbers.

Certificates were issued to inhabitants of all states when the

Continental army agents confiscated their produce.

The massive certif

icate debt which resulted foredoomed Congress's efforts to restore its
currency.

Loaded down with Quartermaster and Commissary notes, the

people refused to pay the state taxes levied for Continental purposes
unless certificates were accepted.

It was politically impossible for

the states to refuse to accept certificates for any taxes, especially
since militaiy impressments were still putting them into the hands of
their people.

Since state taxes returned certificates, the bulk of

outstanding Continental currency remained untouched.

Even with the

best of intentions, the states found it extremely difficult to comply

21Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 33.
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with the procedure set forth in the plan of March, I78O.

The states

could not realize the expected income from the emission of the new bills
since they could not withdraw the old currency.

22

Money conditions in New Hampshire reached such a condition of
paucity that, in one instance at least, the state could not send a dele
gate to Congress.

The Continental Congress was constantly in need of

enough delegates to compose a forum to cariy on business.

This was

another short-coming of the Confederation, but in this particular in
stance New Hampshire simply could not gather enough funds to send a
delegate.

As the New Hampshire Governor explained to the President of

Congress, "It has not been in our Power to famish him with a sufficiency
of hard money and none other will answer."

The people were left "desti-

ture of any Medium" and the scarcity was such that nothing "will produce
it" and "we have not been able to supply the Treasury with any Specie
to answer any Demands.
In fact, the financial condition of the country was such that
John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress, could use "the
unprepared state of the Colonies on the commencement of the War . . .
and the almost total want of everything necessary to carry it on" as an
argument against the accusation that Revolution had been the original
intent of the colonists.

"Had such a scheme been formed, the most war

like Preparations would have been necessary to effect it."^^

This

obviously was not a well-planned, well-equipped Revolution on this side

^^Ibid.. p. 51.
^^Bouton, Documents and Records of New Hampshire. X, ^75.
^^Ibid.. VIII, 122.
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of the Atlantic,

Major-General Sullivan complained constantly to the

Board of War about the lack of supplies for the arTtQr.

In reply the

Board of War explained that the staff department had almost insuperable
difficulties in their way, "among these may be reckoned the want of men
and proper materials; of the former the country is much drained; and of
the latter the old stocks are generally worked up or used, and no pro25
vision made for future wants."
The tremendous problems of depreciation both on the state and
national level reached the realms of absurdity.

For example, in 1779

the cost of six pounds of snuff reached the height of $72; a pound of
tea cost $35; two and a half pounds of tobacco cost $8.33; a pistol
cost $115 (all new recruits for the Continental army and state militias
had to supply their own weapons—which might in part explain their lack
of enthusiasm for volunteering).

26

However, Irving Brant makes the

startling suggestion that printing money was in itself a form of taxa
tion.

Question;

Continental?

How could Congress tax dollars that weren't worth a

Answer:

Currency inflation is taxation upside down.

The

paper currency Congress emitted was in itself a tax, "a tax of terrific
weight, bearing directly on the people."

As the value depreciated be

yond hope of redemption it had the effect of "a capitol levy upon credi
tors, virtually wiping out the value of promissory notes and mortgages."
The implication is clear—the leaders knew, even if the people did not,
that during the Revolution when they appeared to be conducting a war

25
-^Hammond, Letters and Papers of Ma.jor-General Sullivan, II, 79.
^^Simeon E. Baldwin, "The New Haven Convention of 1788," Papers
of the New Haven Colony Historical Society (New Havenj Printed for the
Society, 1882),?. 61.

against taxation, Congress was actually taxing more heavily "by means of
the printing press than Parliament had done in all history."
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Analyz

ing the years of 1775 to 1779, Robert Livingston, Secrertary of Foreign
Affairs, declared that through the depreciation of continental bills of
credit "the states that received them paid a tax equal to all the ex
penditures of the army and a very considerable one beyond it . . . and
this tax too was most unjust and partial than can be conceived."
Colonial practice became Revolutionary policy.

28

In wars past,

all colonial governments utilized fiat money as the only way of meeting
the expenses.

The Revolution was a much larger entearprise, and the

common need precluded any nice regard for a stable currency.

The colon

ists had no hard coin, nor banking institutions which could provide a
stable currency.

If depreciation was an evil of the Revolution it was

an evil that resulted from necessity.

The Continental Congress and the

thirteen states were both in a sinking ship with only paper money to
throw overboard.

If requisitions were a failure it was largely due to

the poverty of the country.
cial demands of a major war.

The states were unable to meet the finan
For example, from December, 1779, to June,

1780, Congressional drafts amounted to approximately $U0,000,00G.

And

it must here be noted that the states made unusual efforts to discharge
the drafts.

They accepted and eventually paid $3^,000,000 and in later

months discharged nearly $2,000,000 more.

Under the stress of poverty.

Congress in I78O attempted to delegate further responsibility to the
states by turning over the burden of paying the army, both the arrears

^"^Irving Brant, The Life of James Madison (6 vols.; Indianapolis;
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 191^1), II, 323.
^^Ibid., p. 32U.
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of salary and the pay due for the current service.If the states
failed it was not from a lack of effort.

A request is no different

than a demand when neither method can produce what is not there.

Even

had Congress used coercive powers, the financial history of the Revo
lution would have been no different.

^^Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 52.

CHAPTER III

DEDICATED TO THE IDEAL OF INTEREST, NOT PRINCIPLE

Aside from money headaches there was the problem of governing a
people who were suspicious of statecraft.

It must be remembered that

the Articles of Confederation took two years to draw up and three years
to ratify.

It established a government which would rale with carefully

limited powers.

It was weak because the delegates reflected the atti

tudes of constituents who wanted weak government.

The reaction against

the British experience produced a government of strict construction—
not from oversight—but from a conscious fear of strength.

Citizens

and delegates alike watched warily the functioning of government, and
any sign of power was greeted with accusations of tyranny.

Suspicious

of government, citizens were also far too concerned with their own selfinterest.

Self-interest opposed to national interest created problems

in counterfeiting, illicit trade and even in recruiting soldiers for the
array.
By 1782 illicit trade had become so widespread that Congress fin
ally produced a resolution against it.

Before going into the resolution,

it is well to note here the Congressional style of writing.

It is char

acteristic of the timid to couch their language in melodramatic phrases;
to accuse by distortion—thereby hopefully achieving the same effect
that a simple command would produce.

Congress in most of its resolu

tions took on the form of a timid fgither direfully portraying the con
sequences of the son's transgressions instead of striking at the seat
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of the matter, thus ending further dissent.
did Congress couch resolutions.
enemy's arch weapon.

In melodramatic phrases

Illicit trade was portrayed as the

The enemy was "resorting to every expedient which

may tend to corrupt patriotism ... or to weaken the foundation of
public credit" and in pursuance of such policy the British encouraged
illicit trade between the colonists and those who lived within the
places in British possession.

Those in the American camp who frater

nized thus lAth the eneriQr were indeed the traitors who were "prompted
either by a sordid attachment to gain or by a secret conspiracy with
the Enemies of their country."

As a consequence, "payment of taxes is

rendered more difficult and burdensome to the people at large, and
great discouragement occasioned to honest and lawful commerce."^

Con

gress, after direfully portraying the results of this nefarious trade,
handed the entire sticky mess over to George Washington.

He was given

full authority to do whatever he thought proper to end such trade.
Congress was very explicit in describing the evils, but very vagae in
authorizing a plan of action.
"A Plain FaiTner," in the New Jersey Gazette, declared that dar
ing the past "few weeks" no less than forty to fifty thousand pounds in
specie, otherwise available for payment in taxes, was drained out of New
Jersey by "moonlight peddlars."

2

The Virginia delegates wrote to Gov

ernor Harrison that "illicit trade with New York under the encouragement
of the enemy, and the obstruction of foreign trade has increased of late
so far as to threaten great injury to the public finances."

^Hutchinson and Rachel, Papers of Madison, IV, 3^2.
^Ibid., p. 35U.

3ibid.. p. 36i|.
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Edmund
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Randolph of Virginia found that illicit trade was exciting general in
dignation in New York and threatened the loss of hard money.

"The

continued drain which it makes from the bank must at least contract
its utility, if it produces no greater mischief to it."^

Although the

legislature of New Jersey and a Committee of Congress were devising a
remedy for this "disgraceful and destructive traffic," Randolph held
little hope that any adequate cure could be applied, "whilst our fore^-gn
trade is annihilated and the enemy in New York make it an object to
keep open this illicit channel."^
Public officials did not separate their private affairs from
the business of government.

"Merchants viewed it as no breach of pro

priety if, as public officials, they were linked in a dozen secret
partnerships with persons who sold goods to the government."

6

The

Secretary of Finance, Robert Morris, is an excellent example of this
business ethic.

E. James Ferguson finds that Morris and his partner,

John Bingham, found "money, ships, and cargoes" for their own enter
prises but were "apparently" unable to do as much when their private
business was not involved.
West Indian trade.

Bingham was sent to Martinique to handle

There was a problem in raising money to put the

firm into operation.

Morris wrote to Bingham that a "certain" cargo

would be sent on private rather than public trade, "as we want to throw
Funds into your hands."

As Ferguson comments wryly, "When a choice

could be exercised, it would appear that personal concerns sometimes
7

got priority over those of government."'

^Ibid.. p. 3^0.

^Ibid.

^Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 7ii.
"^Ibid., p. 80.
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The Deane-Lee controversy that ended on the floor of Congress
began its sordid histoiy in Europe.

Silas Dean was first sent to Europe

as an agent for the Secret Committee, an office for procuring goods for
the United States.

His mission was to obtain loans in France and buy

military supplies for Congress.
found time to profit personally.

While sent on official business, Deane
"The Indian Contract," which Robert

Morris and five other members of the Secret Committee concocted, stipu
lated that Deane was to buy goods to the amount of $200,000—on credit
if possible—while the other partners used committee money to buy and
ship American products to pay the debts Deane contracted in Europe.
Deane was next appointed to the post of Political Commissioner
at the French Court.
the United States.

His new post involved dispatching Frfflich loans to
Privy to the sailing schedules of ships, Deane knew

when government cargoes were not completely full and shipped private
goods.

Within limits he could delay or hasten Continental warships to

provide convoys for ships with private goods aboard.

He and other Con

tinental agents also had liberal freedom to dispose of booty taken by
American privateers and ships of war.

But Deane's greatest indiscre

tion concerned the refitting of a ship in which the United States held
a half-interest, and private companies the rest.

The ship's captures

did not pay the expense of its refitting and Deane turned over the pub
lic's share to the private interests without requesting payment or an
estimate of the ship's v41ue.

A ship bought and equipped largely at

American expense fell into private hands.

It would seem that private

and public interests were shuttled back and forth according to the pros
pects of profit.

Criticism was also aroused by these secretive maneuvers

3li
because the cruise seriously compromised French neutrality and brought
g

protests from the French Court.
As early as 1777 states were beginning to complain about the
problems of counterfeiting.

The effects on the paper currency issued

by the states were disastrous.

Counterfeiting was difficult if not

impossible to trace to its source.

A petition was sent to Congress

from the Assembly of New Hampshire asking for aid, since counterfeiters
had successfully demoralized the state.
Very lately certain wicked and designing men, no ways regard
ing the Welfare and Happiness of the said State, but from Base
and sordid Motives have Fabricated and Uttered within the said
State, great numbers of Counterfeit Bills in imitation of the
paper bills Emitted as Aforesaid, by Reason whereof trade and
intercourse are nearly at an end to the very great Damage of the
said State."
Richard Henry Lee, in 1778, wrote to Patrick Henry about the chaos in
state emissions from counterfeiting.
Already the Continental emissions exceed in a sevenfold pro
portion the sum necessary for medium; the State emissions added,
greatly increase the evil. It would be well if this were all,
but the forgeries of our currency are still more mischievous.
They depreciate not only by increasing the quantity, but by
creating universal diffidence concerning the whole paper fabric.
In my opinion these Miscreants who forge our money are as much
more criminal than most offenders, as parricide exceeds murder.
Reciniiting soldiers was a duty delegated to the states.

That the

states had trouble raising the number Congress and General Washington
requested is witnessed by the method of enlistment New Hampshire devised.
Finding herself destitute of new recruits owing to Massachusetts' entic
ing offer of forty pounds bounty. New Hampshire, fighting principle with

^Ibid., pp. 86-90.
O
Bouton, Documents of New Hampshire^ VIII, 598.
^^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, I, U^O.
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interest, offered a larger bounty.

Complaint then followed from states

bordering on New Hampshire, for their ranks were suddenly depleted—the
line forming on the right side of the New Hampshire border.

As New

Hampshire explained to the rankled Governor of Connecticut, "Nothing,
but being reduced to the alternative of giving a larger bounty than was
advised by the Committee at Providence or not raising the men propor
tioned, would ever have induced this State to depart from their recom-

11

mefflidation."

Meschech Weare of New Hampshire replied to General

Sullivan's entreaties that soldiers were scarce because of this battle
of the bounties.
Much pains have been taken to compleat the Quota of this
State Allotted for the defence of the State you are in; but
unforeseen embarrassments have been thrown in the way, chiefly
tgr tha Meighboring State ojf Ife.ssachusetts, iffho have within a
few weeks . . . hired 500 Ttien in this State at the Enormous
rate of 100 pounds and 12? private bounty per man for nine
months, and taken away a considerable nxunber that was engaged
to Serve under you.^2
New York could not gain enough men for their quota through other
reasons.

Their particular trials were related in a letter from the New

York Council of Safety to the Committee of Safety of New Hampshire.
Five counties of the state were in possession of the British, and three
others were "disunited by malcontents who mediate a Itevolt and are at
tempting to avail themselves of the present troubles to advance their
interested Purposes."

Of the remaining six counties, "a third part" of

three of them—Orange, Ulster and Dutchess—"has been in actual service
ever since May last and are yet in the field"; Westchester had been so
harrassed by the "incursions of the Enemy from New York" that its militia

llBouton, Documents of New Hampshire, VIII, ii97.
^%ammond. Letters of John Sullivan. Ill, 61.
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was forced to provide for its own defence.

Add to this the number of

inhabitants "constantly employed on the Ctomraunications, in transporta
tion, etc.; and the still greater number who, tempted by prospects of
ease and profits have quitted this invaded State and sought inglorious
quiet among our more peaceful neighbors; and you Sir, will perceive how
13
greatly our strength is exhausted." ^

In short. New York was unable to

provide its quota for the army, and New Hampshire was on her own in
raiding enough to satisfy General Sullivan.
Governor Trumbull of Connecticut complained to Meschech Weare
that "the Supineness and languor that seems to take place and pervade
every order and degree of men through our State" must be of great concem to everyone who observed it, "and if continued much longer will
without the special interposition of Heaven be followed with the most
unhappy consequences."

Instead of fighting in the field, the Continen

tal Officers were "wasting their time in ineffectual efforts to gain
Recruits in the Country."

Governor Trumbull admitted that his state

was as guilty as the rest, "tho' we are now using our utmost efforts to
compleat our Battalions and send them into the Field, by detaching our
Militia to fill up vacancies where they do not procure a sufficient
1)

number to Inlist voluntarily."
fighting men.

States were having difficulty finding

The solution, according to Richard Henry Lee, was to

utilize the suggestion of Congress.
I really believe that the numbers of our lazy, worthless
young Men, will not be induced to come forth into the service
of their Country unless the States adopt the mode recommended

^^Bouton, Documents of New Hampshire, VIII, 614.8.
^^Ibid., p. Ii90.
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by Congress of ordering Drafts from the Militia. This may
induce the young and lazy to take the Continental Bounty,
rather than serve for nothing of that sort.15
Analyzing the temper of the people at that time, Irving Brant
maintains that in "the early period of high continental power" impress
ment was formally authorized by Congress.

At this time Congress was

more ready to utilize power than was General Washington.

The failure

of impressment was not due to "Constitutional qualms," but to the lack
of power to make such an order effective.

The array alone could make

seizures, and it could do so only within the range of foraging expedi
tions.

Outside this range the states had to take up the call for arms,

"but in Virginia, where the state had the military forces capable of
making impressments and where the governor and cotincil hated profiteers,
the state shared the powerlessness of Congress.

Public opinion at this

time was too hostile, or too lethargic, for state action."

Federal

impotence was not caused by "the theoretical division of authority, nor
was impotence confined to one government."

In short. Congress and the

states "ran into two angles of the same rock—the unwillingness of the
people to sacrifice private gain for the public good.
The people found it more profitable to sell their produce to
British troops.

The enemy had solid coin, and the United States a flood

of depreciated bills.

Many states found it necessary to pass laws re

stricting the sale of cattle and sheep.

New Hampshire found the sup

plies for the army so scarce that they issued a law in which each town
was to have a "selectman" examine all sheep and cattle passing through

^^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, I, 286.
l^Brant, Life of James Madison, II, 36h.
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their tovn.

If the sheep or cattle were found to be contraband, and

not destined for the digestion of Continental soldiers, th^ were to be
confiscated and sold "by said examinants at private sale for the most
they will fetch to ar^ person and the money arising by such sale . . .
shall be paid into the hands of the receiver-general of this State for
17
the use of the same."

Richard Henry Lee described the smuggling

trade in Virginia to Governor Thomas Johnson of Maryland:
Passing thro' this Country on ray way from Congress, I find
it the common talk here, that many avaricious, inconsiderate,
and ill-designing people, have practiced largely the carrying
live stock and other provisions to the enemies ships of war,
now in the Potomac River opposite Boyds Hole. In particular,
I am told of many boats loaded with provisions going to these
ships from your shore ... It appears to me of much conse
quence to the common casisA, as well as to the reputation of
our respective government's, that this pernicious trai'fic
should be prevented in the future.
When the states prohibited exportation of provisions from their
territories another problem then arose; the high prices charged for
these goods by their own citizens.

Caesar Rodney explained the dilemma,

". . . Prices have not only increased very rapidly but there is a gen
eral Indifference almost amounting to Disinclination to sell even those
Commodities most necessary for the army."^^

To John Dickinson, Caesar

Rodney spoke of the proliferation of speculators—in this instance,
flour speculators.

Writing to Dickinson for instructions on what method

he was to use in procuring flour, Rodney warned that the price of flour
might prove exorbitant.

"You may Assure them I shall do everything in

17
Bouton, Documents of New Hampshire, VIII, 696.
^®Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee. I, 369-370.
^%eorge Herbert I^den, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney. 17^61781; (Philadelphia; University of "Pennsylvania Press, 1933), p. 327.
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my power to forward the business, but expect the flower will come high,
as those termed Speculators are as thick and as industrious as Bees,
and as active and wicked as the Devil himself."

PO

A great deal of the Confederation's troubles came not from the
government, but from the governed.

Viewing the turmoil from a distance

one is tempted to rest the case on Mark Twain's explanation;

"The evils

of life are the eternal cruelties, hypocrities, and stupidities of man
kind which have nothing to do with time or place but result from our
Heavenly Father's haste in experimenting when he grew dissatisfied with
the monkey."

^Qlbid., p. 299.

CHAPTER IV

THE TIMID DARE NOT

The impotence of the Confederation was also caused by the inepti
tude of the delegates.

The delegates' refusal to utilize any of the

Congressional powers and their excessive loyalty to state welfare
greatly decreased the prestige of the Congress.

The Congressional

"slump" of 1779 was explained by a contemporary of the time as the
result of public disaffection with the Congressional delegates.

"The

public believes that the states are badly represented, and that great,
and important concerns of the nation are horribly conducted, for want
either of abilities or application in the members, or through discord
and party views of some individuals."^

Caesar Rodney wrote of this

disaffection to Henry Laurens, then President of Congress;

"I am sorry

to say, the suspicicas Congress entertains of the disaffection of the
people is too well founded, but as the people at large are generally
2
directed by those at the Helm, Hope they will soon mend."
Many delegates became disgusted with their fellow members.
Sullivan wrote to George Washington,
Plans of finance and all other matters go on so slowly that
I tremble at the consequence. I am mortified at the useless
harangues which consume our time to no purpose. I fully agree
with your excellency that Congress ought to have more power but
I also think the old members should be in heaven or at home
before this takes place.^

^Brant, Life of James Madison, II, 3k^Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, p. 263.
^Hammond, Letters of John Sullivan, II, 293.
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Pressing business was often left undecided while members in
dulged in vacuous oratory.

Since there were no public audiences, the

delegates were evidently trying to impress one another.

John Banister

first hinted the worst concerning the desires of the delegates to get
down to business.

Referring to the Congressional question of half-pay

measures for the ariiQr, he noted that "the greatest ignorance in every
occurance [sic ] of that kind mixed with an inactivity that permits
affairs of greatest magnitude to lie dormant and give place to trifles"^
was the predominant characteristic of Congress.

Richard Henry Lee

wrote in disbelief, "The delay producing powers of some men, the des
truction of time under pretext of order, and by long confident speeches,
that I have never seen less business done in any Assembly than has been
with us the last six or eight months."

A man evidently used to activ

ity, Thomas Rodney grumbled in writing about Congressional indolence.
In reference to the problems of finance, his chief complaint was in the
inability of the members to arrive at a plan of action after agreeing
on the "pernicious" practice of Tender laws.

"A very long debate en

sued" because some were against recommending to the states the repeal
of Tender laws, thinking it would give "a fatal stab" to the new money;
all the rest were in favor of having this ddrie, "but could not agree in
the manner of doing it," so that "the whole day was taken up in debat
ing about the form of the resolution suited to the occasion and one
form after another vras voted out till all parties got bewildered in

^Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 319.
^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, I, iiU9.
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the debate and at length adjourned desiring that some member would have
one ready in the morning."^
Writing to John Iredell, William Johnson of Connecticut declared,
"The great delay in deliberative councils of so numerous a body as Con
gress must necessarily take place . . . but much time is too often spent
in debate, and there is no man of sufficient credit or influence to take
the lead, or give tone to business."

7

John Mathews of South Carolina

wrote to George Washington, "Congress has not a single means in their
power to remedy the accumulated evils, and what is worse, there does not
appear to be a disposition to endeavor at it.

Whenever the subject is

brought up, men shrink from it as if the case was desperate."

g

Too often the Continental Congress became an exclusive debating
club rather than an efficient body of men dedicated to the duty of gov
erning the society of the nation.

Thorny problems were debated, re-

debated and tabled until months and even years passed before final
solution.

The solution often resolved itself, without aid from Congress.

For example, consider a dispute between Vermont and Mew York—
The origins of the dispute between Vermont and New York began in
colonial times.

The conflict was between New York and New Hampshire

because both claimed the right to grant lands in the territory that is
now Vermont.

As early as 17i;9 the Governor of New Hampshire granted

the first township west of the Connecticut River.

In granting this

territory he: had assuined that it was within the jurisdiction of New

^Edmund Cody Burnett (ed.), Letters of Mgabees of the Continen
tal Congress (10 vols.; Washington, D,CoS Carnegie Institution of
Washington', 193h), VI, 35.
"^Ibid., p. 51.

^Ibid., p. 63.
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Hampshire.

By 176ii the Qovemor had granted approximately three million

acres of the best lands in Connecticut Valley, the Champlain Valley and
the Southwest, chiefly to New England land speculators.^

The opposition

in New York against these New Hampshire grants came mainly from a class
of men known as speculator-proprietors.

They were successful in gaining

a decision against the New Hampshire grants.

In 176ii the Privy Council

declared the west bank of the Connecticut River "to be" the boundary
between New York and New Hampshire.

The decision was received with

satisfaction by New York speculators, but with apprehension by other
speculators in New England.

If the Privy Council decision had declared

only that the grants were transferred from the jurisdiction of New Hamp
shire to that of New York, the speculators in New Hampshire titles would
have had little to fear.

However, the wording of the decision enabled

New York to state that the lands in dispute were under the jurisdiction
of New York and had been since 16614..^'^
shire were therefore Illegal.

The titles granted by New Hamp

From this moment land speculators who

claimed grants under New Hampshire began^their'long struggle against
New York over these lands.
The dispute over land grants, however, was only part of the
drama which in the end produced an additional state to the Union. Backcountry versus Seaboard produced friction which eventually begat a
separist movement.

In the 1760's and 1780's the backcountry inhabi

tants felt themselves greatly exploited by New York.

The struggle

^Chilton Williamson, Vermont in Quandary; 1763-182^ (Montpelier;
Vermont Historical Society, 19ij.9), p. 7.
^Qlbid., p. 11.
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entered its final phase after the passage of the Intolerable Acts of
ink.

The overthrow of New York's authority was prompted by the pro

tests of the backcountry merchants against these act.

They held con

ventions to demand redress of grievances, and to demonstrate inter
colonial solidarity by coercing Great Britain with non-import and
non-consumption agreements.

Seaboard New York sought the cooperation

of the "inhabitants of the Grants" in these retaliatory measures.

This

gave the inhabitants of the Grants an opportunity to protest not only
against Great Britain but also against New York.
strength rapidly.

The radicals gained

By 1775 they were able to control a Cumberland County

convention and more protests were levelled against New York than Great
Britain.

Among their protests were; (1) the great expense the courts

charged; (2) the large increase in the number of lawsuits tried in
these courts; (3) and the inconvenience and expense of attending them;
(k) lastly, the excessive salaries of their representatives in the New
York Assembly and the extravagantly large fees charged by attorneys—
all of which were "very burthensome and grievous.
The first step toward independence was taken in 1775 when a call
was issued by the leaders on the west side of the Green Mountains for
a convention to determine whether the laws of New York concerning land
titled should be enforced, whether a method for suppressing their op
ponents in the Grants could be agreed upon, whether to send an agent to
the ContinKital Congress, and "whether the Convention will consent to
Associate with New York, or by themselves in the cause of America."

12

The Dorset Convention, as it was called, made clear to the other states

^^Ibid., p. US'

^^Ibid., p. 55.
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that it drew a sharp distinction between the dispute with New York and
the cause of the states in their dispute with Great Britain.

It also

made the decision to appeal for aid east of the Green Mountains.
the Connecticut Valley rebellion was simmering.

In

The grievances of this

region were partly due to the land controversy, but more especially to
the inequalities between seaboard and backcountry.

By 1776 both east

and west had coalesced under one pledge—the independence from New York
and the establishment of a new state.
The significance of this movement is two-fold: It demonstrates
the problems of integration faced by the new nation, and secondly, the
refusal of Congress to face and solve such a problem.

Vermont had made

clear at the Dorset Convention the distinction between their dispute
with New York and the general dispute of all the colonies against Great
Britain.

To the Vermonters there seemed to be no contradiction in thiss

a separist movement that claimed unity to the whole.

That contradiction

was a problem the Continental Congress faced with all the states.

A

nation in the sense that all were united for the common cause, the
states were separate from one another in every other aspect.

Not only

did the backcountry feel distinct from the seaboard, the North was dis
tinct from the South, and each state was a separate entity unto itself.
Unification was achieved out of a common need, integration was a long
drying cement that only time, and custom, could solidify.

The Contin

ental Congress, aware of the frailty of such a watery base, undertook
to solve such problems with reluctance.

Congressional tactics, never

too efficient, often in such cases became sluggish to the point of
"sleeping it off."

In such instances the problem resolved itself.

hi

helped only by the sighs of relief issuing forth from Congressional
chambers.
Having early in the War declared their independence, with the
name of New Connecticut, the inhabitants of the Grants sought admission
to the Union as a distinct state, but because of the opposition of New
York, Congress shied away from the problem.

The Vermonters therefore

declared that, if Congress was unwilling to receive them, there were
other alliances they could make.

Vermont began to make encroachments

upon New York on the one side and New Hampshire on the other.

In I78O

John Sullivan wrote a letter to Meschech Weare criticising the delay
tactics of Congress.

"Congress have not yet come to a single resolu

tion respecting Vermont, though it has been five days on the Tapis.
By 1781 evidence showed that Vermont was actually in negotiations with
agents of the British Crown.

Congress was then forced to notice the

dilemma and went so far as to produce a resolution calling for a com
mittee to investigate Vermont's claims.
President of Congress, reported:
my last.

But in 1782 Samuel Livermore,

"Nothing material has occurred since

Congress are come to no determination concerning Vermont."

They are such divided in opinion about the Steps that ought to be
taken.Vermont proceeded to set up a separate government, despite
Congressional reprimands, and eventually was accepted into the Union
as a separate state, almost by the process of osmosis.
Congressional indolence was a fault among many.

The delegates

viewed one another with distrust, and looked with suspicion on any sign

^3Bouton, Documents of New Hampshire, X, 375.
%bid., p. Ii78.
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of power in Congress.

George Washington made the mistake of voicing

his concern for the need of "bracing up the Confederation" by monetary
means to Samuel Osgood.
viewo

Osgood's reply was not agreeable to Washington's

"Our danger lies in this—that if permanent Funds are given to

Congress, aristocratic influence, which predominates in more than a
major part of the United States will finally establish an arbitrary
government.The specter of "aristocratic influence" was even more
feared than the tangible forms of the Congressional bo(^.

A carefully

limited government was instituted to thwart aristocratic influence.

Yet

because of the ambitious tenacles of such a specter all men dedicated
to the principles of the Revolution must ever be on guard against its
encroachments.
of wealth.

A poor government was raised to withstand the strength

Richard Henry Lee voiced the fear of such strength, and at

the same time asserted the security of poverty.

Speaking out against

the five per cent Impost, then before the states for ratification, Lee
wrote,
I am sorry to be compelled to think so, to me it seems too
early and too strong an attempt to over leap those fences,
established by the Confederation to secure the liberties of
the respective states. Where the possession of power creates
as it too frequently does, a thirst for more, plausible argu
ments are seldom wanting to persuade acquiescence.^6
The Impost proposal would sap the authority of the states to levy taxes,
which would leave "the all important power of the purse invested in an
Aristocratic body."

Fearing the power of the purse, many delegates pre

ferred to keep the government in its floundering position rather than to

^^Bumett, Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, VII,
iilli.
^^Ibid., p. Iii6.
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create an efficient funding system for the effective operation of gov
ernment.

Stephen Higgenson of Massachusetts voted against the five per

cent Impost for just this reason.

"The Impost I always was opposed to,

and being now confirmed in my opinion, as to the danger of too great an
influence resulting from it to individuals, already too influential by
far."^^

By giving the power of the purse to Congress, the sword would

soon follow.

"Let us be cautious how we introduce such radical defects

into our system, as may furnish the most distant pretext for foreign
troops to interpose in favor of the Government against the people."
Suspicion was rampant.

18

An unknown member of Congress feared a

conspiracy between Morris, Livingston, the French ministers, Spanish
agents and "some other wealthier Citizens."

Such men formed a "phalanx"

attacking with "great force" those delegates in the Congress who dis
sented from the policies.

"It is their practice to hunt down every man

that can't be brought over to their views and so many Engines are set
to work to depress every individual Opposer, that a Ifen must have more
than a common Share of good fortune to escape them, so that an indepen
dent Spirit here is in constant state of Warfare.To Henry Laurens,
Richard Henry Lee prophesied ruin to the country if trustworthy men were
not fotind.

"I am decided in my opinion, that if the ij. States do not

get into their public councils such of their Men as possess the greatest
abilities and most integrity, in place of the number that now they

^^ibid., p. 167.
^^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, II, 80.
^^Burnett, Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, VII,

618.
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trust5 our liberties will be greatly endangered indeed."

20

The delegates were afraid of any sign of power in the government;
the people, in turn, distrusted their delegates, and in consequence,
they disregarded the resolutions of the delegates.

A sort of "round

robin" was instituted, beginning at the top and percolating downward.
Disobedience was so rampant Caesar Rodney found it necessary to recom
mend some kind of force to "reduce the people to a due subordination to
Government," but he also thought that this disaffection among the citi
zens was founded in "that kind of Careless, Indifference in too many
who are appointed to the Civil line of Duty, which Created the like

21

Indifference and Even Neglect"

in the citizens.

In analyzing the defects of government, Alexander Hamilton attri
buted them to three causes; (1) an excess of the spirit of liberty,
"which has made the particular states show jealousy of all power in
their hands—and this jealousy has led them to exercise a right of
judging in the last resort of the measures recommended by Congress,
and of acting according to their own opinions of their propriety, or
necessity"; (2) a diffidence in Congress of their own powers, "by which
they have been timid and indecisive in their resolutions, constantly
making concessions to the states, till they have scarcely left them
selves the shadow of power"; (3) an insufficient means at the disposal
of Congress to answer the public needs, and "a vigor to draw forth
their engagements with the army";—the consequence of which "has been
to ruin their influence and credit with the army, to establish its

^^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, II, 296.
21
Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, p. h09.

dependence on each state separately, rather on them—that is, rather
than on the whole collectively."

22

It is noteworthy that one of the

greatest critics of the Articles of Confederation blamed the ineffi
ciency of government on those who operated it and not on the stmcture
of that instrument itself.

To George Washington, Congress, as represen

tatives of the states in their united capacity, might properly have
buttressed its own powers, vaguely defined as they were; instead Con
gress had persistently catered to the hesitancies of the states and
thereby "broken the staff in its own hands."23
Vacillation, suspicion, narrow vision and timidity—all were
elements making up a national legislature.
of Congress were issued after long delay.

All important resolutions
Strongly worded statements

were revised, edited and re-revised until their strong content was re
placed with pleadings.

"Urgent requests, earnest solicitations, force

ful pleadings, eloquent appeals from Congress to the states, had become
as commonplace as changes of the moon, and about as effective for mili
tary purposes, whether the appeal were for men, for money or for sup
plies.

Time after time resolutions framed in the Congress had more

of a pleading tone, than one of command.

Strong words were ine"vitably

watered down by the more timid among the delegates.

When resolutions

reached the states the tone was that of a mendicant, and who respects
the wishes of a beggar?

^^Richard B.Morris (ed.), The Basic Ideas of Alexander Hamilton
(New York; Washington Square Press, 1965), p. 7U.
^^Burnett, Continental Congress, p. IiU8.
2i^Ibid.. p. ii7U.
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Congress was hardly energetic in conducting its business, but
often there were not enough delegates represented to conduct business
at all.

The correspondence of the time shows that much of the writing

consisted of requests to the various states pleading for enough repre
sentatives to form a quorum.

The President of Congress sent out a

general circular to the several states.
I am now to inform you that six states are attending, namely,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina and Georgia and from the state of Pennsylvania, Mr.
Gardner. It is the mos-t earnest desire of the states, attending
that your Excellency would urge Delegates appointed to represent
your State to come forward with all possible expedition as any
longer delay may be injurious to the Union.
James Tilton wrote in mortification to his state, Delaware;
Congress are about to send off another express to urge for
ward, if possible, a representation from the delinquent states.
It is mortifying to me, to find Delaware again on the list.
But sir, the situation of congress is truely alarming; the
most important business pending and not states enough to take
it up; whilst those present are fatigued into resentment and
almost despair, with loitering away their time, to little pur
pose.^"
Richard Henry Lee portended ominous consequences if representation did
not soon become adequate.
We are remote from having a Congress, as we were nineteen
days ago—with the southern delegates at Philadelphia and those
of your State [Thomas Lee Shippen] inclusive, we have but Six
States and a half represented. But one delegate as yet from
the eastward, whence formerly proceeded the most industrious
attention to public business—I do not like . . . this strange 27
lassitude in those who are appointed to transact public affairs.
However, if the Continental Congress was having difficulty, there was a

^^Bumett, Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, 711,

617.
^^Ibid., p.

.

^^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, II, 296.
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perverse satisfaction in finding that the states were also having a
difficult time.

Richard Henry Lee found it as difficult to gather a

quorum for business in Virginia as he did in the national government.
In 1780 he wrote to Theodoric Bland, "It is now sixteen days since our
Assembly ought to have met, and yet to this day we have not members
enou^ to make a house, altho' the invasion of our country calls loudly

28

for legislative aid."

To Caesar Rodney's appeal for legislative

action, James Booth replied, "No Urgency or Importance of any Business
29

can, I believe induce them to continue here longer than this week."'^^

The disorganization of Congress was another cause of impotence.
All matters of importance were referred to committees.

Although small

in size when originally appointed, these committees gradually grew
larger as the delegates had second thoughts about the safety of such
matters in the hands of a few.
and diverse were the views»

The more members, the more numerous

When a committee failed to reach a deci

sion on a problem, the problem was transferred to another committee.
% this method. Congress hoped to achieve a solution by introducing
more opinions.

As a consequence, many important issues—those issues

hardest to solve—were bandied about from one committee to another,
sometimes lost in the shuffle or conveniently forgotten until some
force greater than inertia compelled them to bring it up again.

Most

of the administrative departments of Congress, such as War, Treasury
and Foreign Affairs departments, began as standing committees of Con
gress.

But little by little these committees were transformed into

28ibid., p. 209.
^^Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, p. ii09.

boards composed partly of members of Congress, partly of non-members.
Because of the fluctuating membership of Congress the conduct of these
departments came into the hands of the non-members.

They were more

often than not merchants or businessmen who remained in private enter
prise while they pursued their official duties, almost without super
vision.

For instance, overseas supplies were administered until I78I

by committees of Congress whose functions overlapped and whose member
ship continually changed.

The merchants who dominated these committees

either did the work themselves or assigned it to agents appointed for
special missions.

In domestic supplies these same casual arrangements

were also applied.

The Quartermaster and Commissary departments were

supervised—but not administered—by shifting committees composed of
members of Congress and appointed officers.

In charge of each depart

ment was a single executive officer, such as the Quartermaster-General.
However, in practice the Quartermaster-General neither controlled his
organization nor was responsible for it=

He did not appoint his subor

dinates, and, in the absence of a bureaucratic system, it was not pos
sible for him to direct the numberless agents who "swanned over the
country."

These agents acted on their own initiative.

"With public

money in hand and a task to perform, they sallied forth to accomplish
it by their own deviceso"

30

Regardless of the inefficiency of such practices. Congress still
persisted in operating under this system.

EJven more inefficient was

their practice of placing their own members on these boards, even though
these members were likely to remain on a short-term basis.

^Operguson, Power of the Purses p. 73.

Even more
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questionable was the Congressional resistance to "the demands of the
more business-like members to (|o a step further and replace these boards
with executive departments having a single responsible head."^^ (My em
phasis) o

Perhaps it is superfluous to suggest that business in these

departments would have been much more efficient if new members were not
continually replaced—'before they had time to leam the operations of
the department.

Perhaps it is even more superfluous to suggest that

responsibility is acquired only if those appointed believe they will be
held accountable for any action or inaction they take.

As Edmxmd Cody

Burnett points out, Congress had the widest latitude in curing the
miasma prevalent in its departments.

But efforts made to reform their

departments were thwarted by the hesitant members who feared that "by
the touch of these new-constructed instruments of power, virtue would

32

go out of the body of Congress,"

At no time tintil the end of the war was Congress an efficient
body.

Although looked upon with suspicion, the appointments of a separ

ate Secretary of War, a separate Secretary of Finance, and a separate
Secretary of Foreign Affairs added much to the efficiency of the Con
gressional body.

It is especially ironic that not until the last did

Congress create a separate Secretary of War.

Although tte predominant

preoccupation in Congress was the business of war, until a Secretary
was appointed the war was handled through an anomalous body entitled
"The Board of War"„

The chaos prevalent before the appointment of the

Secretary of War can be evidenced by examination of the Commissary-

3lBurnett, Continental Congress, p. 500.
3^Ibid.
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General.

It was a puzzlement to Caesar Rodney why prices were so high

"when there is no other market for those articles"; and, writing to
John Dickinsons, Rodney suggested reform in the Quarter-Master and Com
missary departments.
I must beg leave to submit to you Whether every purchaser
in the Quarter-Master's and Commissaries departments, being
obliged to submit his accounts to, and obtaining the Certifi
cates of their having passed the Inspection of the Supreme
Executive Authority comprehending the district to which they
belong, or such other as they or Congress might constitute for
that purpose—would not in Some measure be a remedy—for tho'
the people in General are not willing to become informers,
they are generally free to say the Truth when called upon.
Especially where they are known and can have easy Access.
This suggestion was never acted upon.
The disorganization of the war effort was in part the cause for
lack of supplies.

Richard Henry Lee was surprised to find that "their

should be a want of flour . . . and proves great want of attention to
the Commissary General because I well know that any quantity might have
*5)
been got in Virginia at a reasonable price."

Perhaps if better organ

ization and better men had staffed the War departments, supplies would
not have been so scarce, and less odium cast upon the states for their
lack of patriotism.
where it belonged.

General Sullivan, at least, cast some of the odium
Referring to the Commissary-General department, he

wrote a strongly condemnatory letter to General Washington.
If their Impudence as well as Indolence did not Baffle all
Description they would have paid Some little attention to this
Post after the Extravagent promises they made to your Excel
lency and myself. We have been led on from Day to Day by their
false promises till our Stores are again Completely Ebchausted.
. . . There is neither Faith, honor, or Integrity in the

33Rycien, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, p. 299.
^^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, I, 3^2.
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Suppliers of this Department and if some Speedy and Effectual
Remedy is not applied the Same consequences which they brought
on the Army last winter must take place here.35
A great deal of the fault lay in an administrative system which
failed to distinguish between public and private functions.

These

supposedly diverse functions were merged in the normal duties of offi
cers who served their country by pursuing their private interests.

In

a sense, administrative positions existed to be exploited, and in many
instances it would have taken superhuman will power for men not to
avail themselves of these opportunities.

With such opportunities ripe

for the taking it was inevitable that public offices would be abused.
It should be noted that, after the Revolution, procedures were changed.
The army was supplied by contract rather than direct purchase by govern
ment officials.
The continuous demand for pay by soldiers was not always caused
by the scarcity of money.

Caesar Rodney suggested that a paymaster

could straighten out some of the chaos.

It appeared to Rodney that a

paymaster was "absolutely necessary" in every Battalion, especially
when they were separated from the army.

"The want of such an officer,"

whose particular business would be to pay the wages of the soldiers,
added immeasurably to the general confusion.

As it was, "the money

. . . having to go thro' so many hands at present," prevented the regu
larity of wage disperson.

» .as the officers have sufficient to

employ them in their own departments, it is a pitty but they were re
lieved of this task."^"^

Had there been a pajnuaster what money there was

^^Hammond, Letters of Major-General Sullivan, I, 306.
^^Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 195^"^Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, p. 81;.

^8
would have been paid regularly, instead of by the intermittent, haphaz
ard method that was employed.

Samuel Chase, in 1776, composed a plan

of reform for carrying on the operations of war.

"If we expect to suc

ceed in the present War, We must change our Mode of Conduct,

The

business of the Congress must be placed in different Hands, distinct
and precise Departments ought to be established, and a Gentleman of the
military must be of the Board of ¥ar."^®

Such simple solutions found

difficult passage through the labyrinthine channels of Congressional
thought.

As a wry old sage once said, "Simple solutions often are so

simple that a fool can't leam them; so hard that a lazy man won't."
However, no matter how inefficient Congress became, it must be
said that never before had such great expense been experienced in colo
nial wars.

As Ferguson points out, while the conflict lengthened into

years a business boom was stimulated, which caused a price inflationj,
which in turn "spurred government and private buying."
ducts and services rose in price.

Domestic pro

Since Congress rarely had money

equal to its immediate obligations, it could not economize by planning
ahead.

"Forced to construct the apparatus of government amidst the

havoc and crisis of war, it was further handicapped by a realization
that public opinion would tolerate little centralization of power.
Iftitil the end of the fighting, supply and procurement remained a hur39
ried improvisation in the face of emergency."

Furthermore, the

encompassing confusion almost completely prevented public officers
from effectively supervising supply and demand.

Consequently, the

38Hammond, Letters of Ma.lor-General Sullivan, I, 306.
3%erguson, Power of the Purse, p. 27.
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costs were increased by inefficiency, waste and corruption.

A further

drain on the federal resources resulted from the excessive number of
employees in the civil service attached to the army.

Large numbers of

personnel were kept at tasks requiring only a fraction of their time.
The real expense of the war was therefore enormous.

A member of Con

gress lamented, "The Avarice of our people and the extravagant prices
of all commodities joined with the imperfect management of our Affairs,
ho

would expend the mines of Chili and Peru."

^^Bumett, Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, III,

28.

CHAPTER V

"THE GREATEST NUISANCE TO MANKIND IS MAN"

The Constitution of the United States gained its flexibility and
strength from its "implied powers".

The Articles of Confederation was

narrowly construed by the delegates, but this need not have been the
case.

As early as 1781 certain members of the Continental Congress

tri^d to make use of "implied powers".

The argument over what consti-

/^

tuted a majority of states to pass legislation is a case in point.

The

requirement that a majority of nine states must be obtained before leg
islation could be passed is one of the great criticisms of the Articles.
Some delegates felt—as do modem historians^— that such a rule would
block efficient government.

These same delegates insisted that the

following clause in Article IX implied that a majority of nine states
could be interpreted to mean five states:

^Andrew C. McLaughlin, describing the congressional attempt to
procure the five per cent Impost resolution, agreed with George Wash
ington, "I do not conceive we can exist long as a nation without having
lodged somewhere a power, which will pervade the whole Union in as
energetic a manner as the authority of the State governments extends
over the several states." McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Con
stitution, p. 88. Edmand Cody Burnett stressed, in The Continental
Congress, the inability of the government to attain an efficient fund
ing system through the process of ratification the Articles of Confed
eration provided. Each time i;his proposal was submitted it was blocked
by one or another state, while yet many others accepted the proposal.
Eight states might accept the Impost, but the one state that did not
prevented the proposal from becoming law. Both historians maintained
a midway position in their evaluation of the Articles of Confederation.
The Confederation was not as heinous as some historians portrayed, but
certain mechanical defects—such as the stipulation that nine states
must agree to pass legislation—prevented it from being a competent
instrument of government.
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The united states in congress assembled shall never engage
in a war, nor grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of
peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin
money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums
and expenses necessary for the defence and welfare of the
united states, nor appropriate money . . . unless nine states
assent to the same: nor shall a question of any point, except
for adjourning from day to day be determined, unless by the
votes of a majority of the united states in Congress assembled.
Thomas Rodney recorded the outcome of the debate in his diary.

Madison,

Duane, Root, Witherspoon and Wolcott first argued that the Confederation
had enumerated powers which could not be efficiently utilized if it
required the assent of nine states.

Therefore, this Article should be

interpreted to mean that a majority of nine—which was five—could
decide the business of Congress.

"These men stated emphatically that

unless this construction was put on the clause the government wouldn't
be able to do much."

To Thomas Rodney, as with a majority of the mem

bers, this interpretation smacked of tyranny.

"Here [we] had the

opportunity of seeing the maxim 'all men would be tyrants if could get
the power.'

Was sorry to see such a keen struggle to increase the

power of Congress beyond what the states intended so early as but the
third day after completing the Confederation."^

After the debate had

spent itself and the smoke cleared, it was decided that no business
would be undertaken unless nine states were represented, and no vote
on an issue could be passed except with the assent of seven.

The broad

constructionists were defeated in the first issue that confronted them,
and, as we shall see, would be continually defeated—with just one ex
ception.

^Solberg, Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union, p. k2.
^Burnett, Letters of Members of the Continental Congress. VI, 21;.
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In March, 1781, Madison proposed to amend the thirteenth Article,
"Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States in
Congress on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to
them."^

This article vested the Confederation with an implied power to

enforce and "carry into effect" all the Articles against "any State
which shall refuse to abide by their determination."

Madison realized,

through previous experience, that implied powers carried no weight with
the members of Congress.

Therefore, he proposed to spell it out in

plain language with an amendment, "In case any one or more of the Con
federate States shall refase to abide by the determinations of the
United States in Congress or to observe all the Articles of Confedera
tion as required in the thirteenth amendment the United States is
authorized to employ the force of the United States to compel such
states ... to fulfill their federal engagements."^

Writing to Jef

ferson, Madison feared the outcome of his proposed amendment.

Arming

Congress with coercive powers was necessary due to "the deficiency of
some states which are most capable of yielding their apportioned sup
plies."

Without the necessary force in the general government "the

whole confederacy may be insulted."

If the states refused to ratify

the amendment the government would be "in a worse position" since, as
the Confederation originally stood there was "an implied right of coer
cion against the delinquent states and the exercise of it by Congress
7
whenever a palpable necessity occurs will probably be acquiesced in."

^Solberg, Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union, p. it2.
Hutchinson and RachsL, Papers of Madison, IV, 3^2.
^Ibid., p. 353.

"^Ibid.
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Both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of 1789
can be subjected to strict and broad interpretations.

Early in the

history of the Articles of Confederation certain delegates tried to in
stitute the principle of Implied powers.

Their failure produced a

narrowly constructed government; a purposely weak goverrunent which
would safeguard the rights of citizens against the usurpation inherent
in power.

A statement can be made with some validity, following the

lines of logic stated above; strict constructionalists gained control
of the Articles at an early date, and they developed the government
along tight or state lines.

Conversely, broad constructionalists

gained control of the Constitution early, and developed the new govern
ment along loose or national lines.

If the nationalists had controlled

the government early, would the Articles of Confederation have survived?
When it is considered that tlie delegates in Congress incessantly fought
against any broad construction of the Articles, that they consistently
obstructed any portent of strong goverranent, that they purposely kept
the government poor by refusing Congress a national funding system, it
can be stated that the Confederation fell through the devices of strict
construction.

Through the timidity of delegates the Articles of Con

federation became a brittle instrument.
be bound by the letter of the law.

The rapidity of change cannot

To accommodate the changing needs

of a country, laws must be elastic to meet new exigencies.

A brittle

institution cannot bend under the tension; narrow construction can only
break under the vicissitudes of time that have gone beyond the concepts
of the past.
There was only one successful attempt at a broad constiniction
of the Articles.

The attempt succeeded in part because the strict

6k
eonstractionalists were notoriously short-sighted and men, such as
Madison, utilized tactics that took advantage of that hitherto limiting
tendency.

On the very last day of 1781 Congress passed an act incor

porating the Bank of North America.

Not only was there nc clause of

the Articles which authorized Congress to create corporations, the
Second Article specifically stipulated that "Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and Independence, and every power, jurisdiction
and Right which is not by the Confederation expressly delegated to the
O
United States in Congress assembled.The validity of the charter was
challenged by several delegates, but as Madison explained to Edmund
Pendleton, "When the scheme was originally proposed to Congress for
their approbation and patronage," the delegates promised to incorporate
it "when it was ripe for operation."

When the incorporation bill was

introduced on the floor of Congress, those delegates who had promised
were bound to honor it, that, or awkwardly withdraw their pledge.

Ife,d-

ison further explained, "The competency of Congress to such an act had
been called into question in the first instance, but the subject not
lying in so near and distinct view, the objections did not prevail."
Those delegates who had pledged themselves might have thought that in
the hazy future* such a plan would be lost in the shuffle, but they had
reckoned without the perseverance of their oponents.
bate there was a show of resistance.

In the final de

"On the last occasion, the general

opinion . . . was that the Confederation gave no such power and that
the exercise of it would not avail the institution."^

O
Solberg, The Federal Convention and Formation of the Union, p. I4.2.
^Hutchinson and Rachel, Papers of Madison, IV, 3^3.

6^
James Wilson then -undertook the charter's defence.

The Second

Article of the Confederation Wilson cast aside at the outset as entirelyirrelevant to the question.
To many purposes the United States are to be considered as
one undivided nation; and as possessed of all the rights and
powers, and properties by the law of nations incident to such.
Whenever an object occurs in the direction of which no particu
lar state is competent, the management of it must of necessity
belong to the United States in Congress assembled.
After this broadly interpreted argument it is well to note E. S. Coiwin's statement, "The reflection is suggested that if the Articles of
Confederation had continued to subject this [Wilson's] canon of con
struction, they might easily have come to support an even greater struc
ture of derived powers than the Constitution of the United States at
this moment."

11

Instead of being an instrument of weakness, the Arti

cles could have been a government of strength through its inherent,
latent powers.

Strict construction explicitly follows the letter of

the law, latent powers are implicit and therefore require congressional
willingness to draw them out.
gates feared government.

The people and the congressional dele

Guarding their individual rights jealously,

it would seem that in the end the people could not pardon the Articles
of Confederation for being a national government despite all their ef
forts to the contrary.

The Articles of Confederation became a govern

ment, not for the people, but despite the people.
It should be noted that, once instituted, the Bank of North
America performed an important service to the United States during the

S. Corwin, "The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between
the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia
Convention," American Historical Review, XXX (192^), 529.
^^Ibid.
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years Robert Morris was Superintendent of Finance.

From I782 to 1781;

Robert Morris borrowed a total of one million and a quarter dollars
from the Bank.

In time the directors of the Bank decided enough money

had been loaned to Congress.

So Morris sold $200,000 par value of the

government's shares in the Bank for $300,000 and reduced the national
debt by that amount.

The next year he sold the remainder of the govern

ment's shares to Dutch investors.

By the time he had retired from

office, the debt of Congress to the Bank had been paid, and Congress

12

was no longer a stockholder.

The Articles of Confederation have been subjected to inimical
criticism or downright condemnation or, conversely, applauded—by those
trying to justify positions adverse to the Constitution—as the true
instrument of democracy.

I do not agree with the Progressive historians

who maintain that the period of history under the Articles of Confedera
tion were halycon days of ideal government.

In many ways it was a

period of turmoil, confusion, discord, and disorganization.

I insist

only that the Articles of Confederation, as an instrument of government,
was not the cause of the problems.

Those who managed the affairs of

government and those for whom that government was instituted failed to
utilize well the instrument created for their well-being.

No matter

how grand the plan, it will always fail if a whole people refuse to
abide by its tenets.
Congress.

The temper of the people affected the business of

If Congress had difficulties during the war, ironically they

had even greater difficulties during the peace.

The seeds of dissipa

tion that were sown during the war bloomed forth more profusely after

Jensen, The New Nation, p. 83.
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the war was ended.

"

Stephen Higginson vividly portrayed the scene, "The

habits of indolence and dissipation contracted during the war, are very
much against our making a right improvement of the advantages we have
in possession."

The people in general had lived better than ever before,

and usually in a better manner than their budgets could afford.
And their Ideas can not now be brought to comport, with their
real situation and means of living . . . was there force in the
government to compel the payment of Taxes, the Cure might be
accelerated. Bat in our situation, without Energy and without
Funds beside what may be drawn from the people by Taxes^ it is
a serious and important Question, whether our Government may
not get unhinged, and a revolution take place, before the Cure
can be effected, and the people at large discover-,- that to
secure their Liberties and the great bulk of their property a
certain portion of the latter must be parted with.l5
Only through "sad experience" would the people learn that "the Sover-r
eignty of the States must in a degree be transferred to the Union and
the people at large not so violently opposed to every degree of implicit
obedience.
Andrew McLaughlin found the theories of the day the real source
of misgovernment.

"Because of sinful man, government, an evil in it

self, was necessary, but it should be looked upon with suspicion and
guarded with jealous care."

With such concepts prevalent it was diffi

cult to argue for efficient government and "to point to the necessity
of punishment and restrainto"

It was much easier for the people to

wield power than to give that power to the nation.

"Local authority

was near at hand and in its new dignity was not very different from the
old colonial administration.

The War had begun against general govem-

"To Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higgenson," Annual Report of
the American Historical Association for the Year I896 (Washington, D,C„5
Government Printing Office, 1897), p. 7itl.
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mentj why should implicit obedience be paid to the Congress of the United States, clamoring for power and taxes as George III?" ^
cles of Confederation could have worked.

The Arti

That it did not was due to

the temper of the timres, the blatant disregard for authority, and the
suspicion and distrust of the people toward all g o v e r n m e n t . A m e r i c a n
thought in the eighteenth century believed the nature of man was evil.
As Cecelia Kenyon points out in "Men of Little Faith," the people of
the late eighteenth century thought "the dominant motive of human be
havior was self-interest, and this drive fotind its most extreme polit
ical expression in the insatiable lust for power.

This dreadful lust

l^McLaughlin, Confederation and the Constitution, p. itlo
^^The suspicion and distrust of the people toward all government
can be amply documented from The Antifederalist Papers o As a Massachu
setts Antifederalist wrote under the pen name "Agrippa", "It has been
proved, by indisputable evidence, that power is not the grand principle
of union among the parts of a very extensive empire; and that when this
principle is pushed beyond the degree necessary for rendering justice
between man and man^ it debases the character of individuals, and
renders them less secure in their persons'and property," p. 27. Fear
of government extended itself to such an extreme that the national
capital was seen as the center of corroptiono "The Federal Farmer"
wrote, "We are not to suppose all our people are attached to free
government, and the principles of common law, but that many thousands
of them will prefer a city governed not on republican principles.
This city, and the government of it, must indubitably take their tone
from the characters of the men, who from the nature of its situation
and institution must collect there. This city will not be established
for productive labor . . . However brilliant and honorable this col
lection may be, if we expect it will have any sincere attachments to
simple and finigal republicanism, to that liberty and mild government,
which is dear to the laborious part of a free people, we must assuredly
deceive ourselves." p., 122. The fear of power that prevailed in the
Confederation period did not change overnight and was still prevalent
while states debated the ratification of the Constitution. The major
ity of men in government were Antifederalists-, fearful, as the people,
of strong government. Morton Borden (ed.), Antifederalist Papers
(East Lansing; Michigan State University Press, 1965).
~
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for power was regarded as the universal characteristic of the nature
17
of man, which could be controlled but not eradicated." '

With such

thoughts prevailing, could government be anything more than weak?

^'''cecelia Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on
the Nature of Representative Government," William and Mary Quarterly,
Third Series, XII (19^5), 12.

CHAPTER- VI

THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION

The seeds of disaffection, dissipation and disrespect were soxm
during the Revolution.

Habits acquired and slowly solidified into

custom are not rectified by the reform of a small number of delegates
sitting in a Congress no longer holding the esteem of their constituents.
Respect cannot be regained by the reformation: of the system that caused
its loss.

The Federal Convention was called ostensibly to reform the

Articles of Confederation.

But the movers behind the Convention be

lieved that more than reform was necessary to rectify a situation fast
becoming anarchic.

Washington's alarm at the weakness of the Confeder

ation was deepened as disorders in Massachusetts, in the Fall of 1786,
seemed to portend a crisis for the nation.

"I predict the worst conse

quences from a half-starved, limping government always moving upon
crutches and tottering at every step."^

That this limping condition

was the product of mismaaagement was no longer the concern of Washing
ton, as it had been during the Revolution.

More drastic measures were

now needed; accusations leveled against incompetent officials relieved
only the spleen.

No matter the decision of the leaders, the question

arises; why did the people disobey the Confederation, and obey the
Constitution?

It would seem that the wages of sin, and the price of

^Morris, "The Confederation Period and the American Historian,"
William and Mary Quarterly. Third Series, XIII (19^6), 139.
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excessive liberty were lessons dearly learned.

"Sad experience" had

taught the value of restraint.
In the debates over ratification of the Constitution it is note
worthy that arguments centered around the structure of the Constitution,
not the Confederation; and the argaraents against the Confederation con
sisted mainly of accusations of mismanagement, loss of respect, and the
people's open disregard of governmental restraint.

Governor Huntington

of Connecticut declared, "If we look into history, we shall find that
the common avenue which tyranny has entered in, and enslaved the nations
p
who were once free, has been their not supporting the government."'^
Alexander Hamilton, in the New York debate, cast s|.spersions on the
delegates' excessive loyalty to their states.
In my experience of public affairs, I have constantly re
marked, in the conduct of the members of Congress, a strong
and uniform attachment to the interests of their own state
. . . The early connections we have formed, the habits and
prejudices in which we have been bred, fix our affections
so strongly that no future objects of association can easily
eradicate them.
Something stronger than amendments to the Articles of Confederation was
needed to "eradicate them."

James Madison, in the Virginia debates,

declared that the people's disobedience produced the present necessity
for new government.

The Constitution held no powers that had not been

vested in the Confederation—the only difference was that the Confeder
ation held them in theory and the Constitution in fact.

p

Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the
General Convention at Philadelphia in 178? (6 vols.; Philadelphia;
J, B. Lippincott Company, 1891), II, 198.
^Ibid., p. 266.
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Did we not perceive, in the early stages of war, when Con
gress was the idol of America, and when in pursuit of the
object most dear to America, that they were attached to their
states? Afterwards, the whole current of their affections
was to the states . . . the powers vested in the proposed
government are not so much an augmentation of powers in the
general government, as a change rendered necessary for the
purpose of giving efficacy to those which were vested in it
before. It cannot escape any gentleman that this power, in
theory, exists in the Confederation as fully as in this Con
stitution.^
It should be noted that Madison mentions the time "when Congress was
the idol of America."

This can also imply the Congressional inability

to maintain that respect, and its fall from grace.
Throughout the state debates one is struck by the fact that argu
ments against the Confederation were not on its structure.

All arguments

against the Confederation centered on the condition of the country, the
defects of the delegates, the disobedience of the people.

John Marshallj

later to be the arch nationalist who upheld federal power, argued that
"the inability of Congress and the failure of the states to comply with
the constj-tutional requisitions" rendered -resistance to the enemy more
difficult.

"The weakness of that government caused our troops to be

against us which ought to have been on our side, and prevented all re
sources of the community from being called at once into action . . . a
bare sense of duty, or a regard to propriety, is too feeble to induce
men to comply with obligations."'^

Melancthon Smith of New York, argu

ing over the Constitutional provision for legislation, inadvertently
summed up the difficulty of tha Confederation;
If the people have a high sense of liberty, government
should be congenial to this spirit, calculated to cherish
the love of liberty, while yet it had sufficient force to

^Ibid., III, 2^8.

^Ibid., p. 288.
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restrain licentiousness. Government operates upon the spirit
of the people, as well as the spirit of the people operates
upon it; and if they are not conformable to each other, one
or other will prevail.^
In the Pennsylvania debate, James Wilson described in vivid
detail the disgraceful situation of the country.

"The commencement of

peace was the commencement of every disgrace and distress that could
befall a people in a peaceful state."

Extravagant importations ruined

the economy, "nor could we derive a revenue from their excess."
Through the inability to gain trade in foreign markets, "the Confeder
ation lost national importance.

Devoid of national energy, we could

7
not carry into execution our own resolutions, decisions, or laws."
In Virginia, Madison warned that the loss of liberty was endan
gered more through dissensions than through the fear of tyranny.

By

reviewing history, "it can be found that the loss of liberty very often
resulted from factions and divisions; from local considerations, which
eternally lead to quarrels . . . internal dissensions have more fre
quently demolished civil liberty, than a tenacious disposition in
rulers to retain any stipulated powers."

g

The important question, however, was asked by John Lansing of
New York.

"If the state government's have been unable to compel the

g
people to obey their laws, will Congress be able to coerce them?"
Article III of the Confederation proclaimed;

"The said states hereby

severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for
their common defence, the security of their Liberties, and their mutual
and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against

^Ibid.. II, 375.

"^Ibid.. p. 250.

^Ibid.. p. 1^31.

^Ibid., III, 90.
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all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on
account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence what
ever.

This declaration of unity was a charge no state accepted; a

law on paper, but ignored in practice.

Question;

Why did the people

disregard the Articles of Confederation, and accept the Constitution?
Hypothesis:
selfishness.

Freedom rampant sacrifices the common good for individual
Individual selfishness in turn produces anarchy, and

anarchy endangers personal freedom.

Instability does not produce

prosperity, and the individual's pocketbook is exposed to a competition
without rules.

Stephen Higginson prophesied correctly;

"Sad experi

ence alone will fully satisfy the body of this people that the Sover
eignty of the Several States must in a degree be transferred to the
Union and the people at large not so violently opposed to every degree
of implicit obedience.Experience had taught the need for temper
ance.

It had also taught that freedom without restraint often sacri

fices personal security.

The people, in short, were ready to obey.

And just perhaps, George Washington, as first President under the
newly constituted government, held more respect than a whole Congress
of puny delegates.
The Antifederalists did not deny there were defects in the Arti
cles of Confederation.

They were merely cautious where they believed

the Federalists to be reckless.
general Antifederalist view;

John Lansing of New York expressed the

"... however much I may be disposed to

to perpetuate the union, however sensible of the defects of the Confed-

lOSolberg, Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union, p. ii.3.
Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," Annual Report of the
American Historical Association for the Year I896, p. ^1.
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eratiorij I cannot help differing from those gentlemen who are of the
opinion it is incapable of amelioration."

Instead of breaking com

pletely with the past, and aware of the historical importance of such
an undertaking, Lansing wished to be cautious in reform by amending
the Articles of Confederation.

The form of government was not what

produced the ills of the "present situation," why, then, recklessly
abandon it?
That we have encountered embarrassments and are distressed
for want of money, is undoubted; but the causes which could
not be cojitrolled by any system of government, have princi
pally contributed to embarrass and distress us. Sir, the
instance adduced from the history of the Jewish theocracy
evinces that there are certain situations in communities which
will unavoidably lead to results similar to those we experi
ence. The Israelites were unsuccessful in war, they were
sometimes defeated by their enemies; instead of reflecting
that these calamities were occasioned by sins, they sought
relief in the appointment of a king, in imitation of their
neighbor8.12
The Antifederalists wished to eradicate the ,"sins" of the people without
endangering their freedom.

The Federalists believed correction lay in

centralizing the government and insuring obedience by coercive powers.
One is tempted to mention obliquely in this instance, the Whiskey Re
bellion and the large force led by Hamilton, as an example of this
insurance policy^

With such examples of "coercive powers" one is also

tempted to quote still another sage^

"There is a certain relief in

change, even though it be from bad to worse; as I have found in riding
a horse.

It is often a comfort to shift one's position and be bruised

in a new place."

12

Elliot,,Debates in the Several States, II, 223.
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A large number of men in 178? and 1788 were Antifederalists.
Add to this the fact that history was on the side of the Antifederalist
theory of republican government, and it is doubly astonishing that they
went down to defeat.
Montesquieu taught that republican governments could be
feasible only in small territories. At the center of the
theoretical expression of the Antifederalist opposition to
the increased centralization of power in the national govern
ment was the belief that a republican government was possible
only for a relatively small territory and an equally small
population.^3
It is therefore argued that a large republic was impossible because the
center of the government was too distant from the people.

The interest

of the people in government would decrease; and when this happened they
would grow completely disinterested in government.

Before the debate

over ratification required him to change his view, Alexander Hamilton
was of the same opinion.
It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are
commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness
of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more
attached to his family than to his neighborhood, to his neigh
borhood than to the community at large, the people of each
state would be apt to feel a stronger biats toward their local
governments than toward the government of the Union, lii
The Antifederalists centered their attack, both inside and out
side the state debates, on the construction of the Constitution.

The

arguments against the Constitution centered mainly around these points?
(1) the elections of representatives and senators were not frequent
enough to insure responsibility to their constituents; (2) one repre
sentative for every thirty thousand people was too few; (3) the Senate

^^Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith," William and Mary Quarterly, p„
^Alexander Hamiltoii, John Jay, James Madison, The Federalist
(New York; The Modem Library, 1937), No. 17, pp. 102-103.
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was to help appoint certain officers and were the Judges on impeachment
of such officers5.(Ij.) with the Senate holding such powers, the legislature
blended into the executive and judicial departments; (5) the Vice-Presi
dent was a useless officer, however, he was also to be the president of
the Senate, and in case of division, was to have the deciding vote;
(6) there was no bill of rights; (7) the new constitution provided for
a consolidation of the several states and not a confederation.
The Constitution proposed that the first House of Representatives
should consist of sixty-five members, and afterwards the ratio of repre
sentation should not exceed one representative for thirty thousand
people.

This provision was a chief component of the charge that the

Constitution was not sufficiently democratic.

Sixty-five men could not

possibly represent the variety of interests throughout so large a coun
try.

Those most likely to be left out were the more democratic or

"middling elements" in society.

Melancthon Smith, in the debate over

ratification in New York, declared, "The great easily form associations;
the poor and middling class form them with difficulty."

The "middling

class" could unite only under "some great man, unless some popular
demogogue, who will probably be destitute of principle.

A substantial

yeoman, of sense and discernment, will hardly ever be c h o s e . I t
was a rule of Whig ideology that participation in government was the
legitimate concern only of those who possessed property—for the pro
tection of which, government had been originally founded.

Melancthon

Smith was not opposing this ideology, he was arguing that this ideology

^^Staughton Lynd, Anti-Federalism in Dutchess County, New York
(Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1962), p. 88.
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was not pervasive enough in the Constitution.
tives produced an elite.

Sixty-five representa

That only the most powerful of the propertied

classes would have an active voice in policy, was Smith's accusation.
The basic fear of the Antifederalists was an inbred concern that
government under the Constitution would be controlled by the "great",
and would not truly reflect the interests of all groups in the commun
ity and would almost certainly become oppressive.

In fact, "Majoritar-

ians did not always act in democratic ways," as Richard B. Morris points
out; "... nor did they seem always willing to abide by the will of the
majority.

Witness the shocking abuse of power by radicals of Pennsyl

vania who established the state constitution by fiat and did not dare
submit it to the people.

In fact, they went so far as to require the

people to take an oath to support the constitution as a prerequisite
for franchise.This railroading tactic was also apparent in Pennsyl
vania's ratification of the Constitution.
The cause of the Antifederalist defeat lay in their inability to
compromise among themselves and to provide an alternative plan to the
one proposed by the Federalists.

The term "Antifederalist" seems,

after close examination, to be a convenient tag placed on the men who
opposed the Constitution.

Their ranks did not embody a clear-cut poli

tical philosophy that all Antifederalists affirmed and propagated.
They were instead a heterogeneous group of men thrown together by one
factor; opposition to the Constitution.

Many felt the Constitution was

strong; others believed the Constitution was too weak.

Power should be

^^Morris, "The Confederation Period and the American Historian,"
William and Mary Quarterly, p. 1^6.
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equally distributed, and then again the House of Representatives should
be the strongest.

Many Antifederalists believed that man could govern

without a strong central government, while others held that human nature
everywhere was grasping, evil and rapacious.

17

Against the united,

well-organized opposition, the Antifederalists crumbled to defeat.

Mr.

Randal of Massachusetts acidly wondered out loud about the heavy artil
lery the Federalists used in the state debates:
An old saying is that "a good thing don't need praising";
but it takes the best men in the state to gloss this Constitu
tion, which they say is the best that human wisdom can invent.
In praise of it we hear the reverent clergy, judges of the
Supreme Court, and the ablest lawyers, exerting their utmost
abilities. Now, sir, suppose all this artillery was turned
the other way, and these great men would speak half as much
against it, we might complete our business and go home in
forty-eight hours.18
Whatever the inner division, the Antifederalists were united in
their criticism of the Constitution.
arguments bordering on prophecy.

Ifeny of the objections were cogent

Despite some extreme objections, the

criticisms against the Constitution were an imposing analysis of its
defects.

Because they show the Antifederalist ability to cut incisively

to the heart of the matter, George Mason's objections are the best.
"The president of the United States has no Constitutional Council, a
thing unknown in any safe and regular government.

He will therefore be

unsupported by proper information and advice, and will generally be
directed by minions and favorites, or he will become a tool of the

17Morton Borden (ed.), The Antifederalist Papers (East Lansing:
Michigan State University Press, 1965), pp. 7-lij..
1P

Elliot, Debates in the Several States, II, i^O.

80
S e n a t e . W h e n the cabinet system did evolve, it evolved extra-constitutionally and without cabinet responsibility.

Mason also foresaw the

rift that developed between the northern and southern states economic
ally t
By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and
navigation laws, the five Southern States, whose produce and
circumstances are totally different from that of the eight
Northern and Eastern states, may be ruined, for such rigid and
premature regulations may be made as will enable the merchants
of the Northern and Eastern states not only to demand exorbi
tant freight, but to monopolize the purchase of the commodities
at their own price. Whereas requiring two-thirds of the mem
bers present in the Houses would have produced mutual modera
tion, promised the general interest and removed insuperable
objection to the adoption of this government.
It is apropos to note that in the Federal Convention differences
of opinion did not revolve around basic principles, but around the
vested interests of each state.

Self-interest created controversy,

not basic differences in ideology.

In the compromise over the naviga

tion laws and slave trade, South Carolina and the North "horse-traded".
South Carolina wished to raise the restrictions of the slave trade for
twenty years, and the North wanted to build up their shipping industry.
The South therefore agreed to vote for the proposition that only a
majority in both Houses would be needed to pass navigation laws, and
the North agreed to extend the slave traffic for twenty more years.
Tariffs could be pushed through favorable to the North, which could
prove harmful to the South.

Bat twenty more years of slave trade

enabled the South to solidify her "peculiar institution."

^%olberg, Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union,
p. 336.
^^Ibid.. p. 337.
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A further objection of Mason's was that.
Under their own constmction of the general clause, at the
end of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant monopolies
in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusually
and severe punishments, and extend their powers as far as they
shall think proper; so that the State legislatures have no
security for the powers now presumed to remain to them, or the
people for their rights.21
This suspicion has not been negated with proof to the contrary.
Most Antifederalists believed they were preserving a national
government in their defence of the Articles of Confederation,

In the

debate over ratification, when accused otherwise, they protested that
they also thought in national terms.

General Heath of Massachusetts

proclaimed,
I consider myself not as an inhabitant of Massachusetts,
but as a citizen of the United States. % ideas and views are
commensurate with the continent; they extend in length from
the St. Croix to St. Maria and in breadth from the Atlantic to
the Lake of the Woods; for over all this extensive territory
is the federal government to be extended,22
The Antifederalists, in essence, were arguing for a national government
of restricted powers.

"We ought to be jealous of all rulers,was

their watchword.
Like the Founding Fathers, like the men of their age, they
were great constitutionalists. They were also first-generation
republicans, still self-consciously so, and aware that their
precious form of government was as yet an experiment and had
not proved its capacity for endurance. Its greatest enemy was
man's lust for power and the only thing which could hold this
in check, they were convinced, was a carefully written and
properly constructed constitution,2^

^^Ibid., p. 338.
^^Elliot, Debates in the Several States, II, 13.
^^Ibid., p, 28.
oh

Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith," William and Mary Quarterly, po 2^.
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In suimary, many of the Antifederalist criticisms were valid.
The Senate did become a "rich man's clubj" and more responsive to the
rich than to the poor; the federal government did come to overshadow
the state governments; the Constitution did not lessen sectional ar^imosities; a spoils system did evolve; the control of government by rich
families, the tremendous expense of court cases, the possibility of
minor rebellions against excise taxes, ar^d the prediction that there
would be no limit to the national debt

2^

—all were predicted by the

Antifederalists, and proven through time.

The great conundrum etern

ally harrassing man, "Perfection is not the lot of humanity," was the
subject of Bobert R. Livingston's opening speech at Poughkeepsieo
"o . . perhaps, were the gentlemen on this floor to compare their sen
timents on this subject, no two of them would be found to agree.,

Nay,

such is the weakness of our judgment, that it is more than probable
that, if a perfect plan was offered to our choice, we should conceive
it defective, and condemn it."

Robert R. Livingston was speaking

against the Articles of Confederation.

The same speech could have

been said by those opposed to the Constitution.
was the cause of the Confederation's fall.

Human imperfection

Ratification of the new

Constitution was achieved, in part, through the people's realization of
their transgressions.

The Federalists held a double victoryg a new

Constitution built out of the hard lessons learned from the old, and a
people ready to obey, for the rewards of stability—and the fear of
failure a second time.

2"^
-'Borden, Antifederalist Papers, pp. 7-la.
Of-

""Elliot, Debate in the State Conventions. II, 210.

EPILOGUE

The problems the Federal Convention faced were, essentially, the
same as those faced by the drafters of the Articles of Confederation,
If nothing else, the Articles of Confederation made it possible to fur
ther improve a republican system of government it had initially began^
The problem of selfish interests versus national interests confronted
the drafters of both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.
In some cases the Confederation solved problems of self-interest without
compromise.

For instance, the Articles of Confederation solved the

western land controversy, with all benefits directed to the federal
government.
Only once did Congress demonstrate firmness in the face of state
opposition, and its success demonstrates the congressional potential—
if only that firmness had been constant.
written in London.

The colonial charters were

The King's aides passed out charters to Virginiaj

New York and Connecticut granting them lands extending to the South
Sea.

As a consequence, a number of the colonies had elaborate claims

to western lands.

Efforts were then made by the Continental Congress

to have the states cede their claims to the territories outside their
boundaries.

The small states insisted that these claims were invalid

and should be turned over to the federal government.
insisted that the claims be recognized.
hot and heavy.

The large states

The battle between them proved

In 1781 Virginia, New York and Connecticut agreed to

cede their claims to the federal government upon certain conditions.

83

8k
But, as Virginia delegates reported to Governor Thomas Nelson, Congress
declared "the inadmissability of those cessions upon the conditions
specified."

Congress then fixed a day "for ascertaining the boundaries,

beyond which Congress would not guarantee, and concluded with the recom
mendation to lay out separate states in the ceded lands."

There then

came a motion for recommitment of the question, the advocates acting
upon two different motives, "some intending to open the door for a full
and minute questioning of the territorial rights of those three states,
others proposed that the subject should be handled merely upon the
basis of several resolutions of congress, passed with the express view

1

of stifling inquiries of right."

Matters stood at an impasse until Alexander Hamilton and Philip
Schuyler of New York concluded that if Virginia, Connecticut and New
York all claimed the western territory it was unlikely that New York
nor Connecticut could claim their title.

Therefore, New York publicly

made the gesture of ceding her lands to the federal government with the
proviso that the others do the same.

Connecticut then ceded her terri

torial claims, which placed intense pressure on Virginia,
of 1782 Virginia had acquiesced.

By the end

The importance of such a victory for

the federal government cannot be doubted.

All western lands came under

the jurisdiction of the national government, which would have command
of setting up territorial boundaries and, eventually, new states.

Also,

the federal government made use of these western lands by paying the
Continental soldiers in land scrips.

Congress may have had only worth

less paper money, but it also had something of far more value, and of

^Hutchinson and Rachel, Papers of Madison, III, 287.
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more lasting duration..
The Articles of Confederation was also the first to deal with
the problems of taxation and representation. Innien the committee of
Congress, appointed to draw up the Articles of Confederation, reported
its opinion that financial requisitions should be drawn on the states
in proportion to the number of inhabitants, it also recommended that
each state should be allowed one vote for deciding all questions in
Congresso

"The view that the assessments of the states for requisi

tions to the Congress should be based on population was supported by
the feeling that, on the whole, under the conditions prevailing in
America^ population was a fairly reliable guide to property,,"
this recommendation was not accepted by the delegates»

However,

It was decided

instead to assess each state according to the value of its land.

The

mile that each state was to have one vote was maintained on the insistance of the smaller states, "who were in a position of being able to
exercise a kind of veto."

As a result, "The Articles incorporated the

principle of state sovereignty^, which necessarily meant state equality
2
in the Congress,"
By the time the Federal Convention convened, state sovereignty
had become all-powerful and able to block much national legislation,,
Madison, between the Confederation and the Federal Convention^ was
working on a theory that would cut down the importance of state sover
eignty,,

He tried to evolve a system that would both "support" a due

supremacy of the national authority, and leave in force the local
authorities so far as "they can be subordinately useful."

Madison's

R, Pole, "The Emergence of the Majority Principle," in Pole
(ed.). The Ad - ince of Democracy (New York; Harper and Row, 1967), p. 86.
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plan entailed the idea of individuals, instead of states, who would be
represented on a numerical basis "in a single, national legislature,
whose composition would not be affected by state boundaries."

The

Virginia Plan, when originally presented, distinguished between persons
and property—the two separate sources of representation.

"This well

established doctrine of American Whiggery embodied a pale reflection of
the British distinction between Lords ajid Commons, and issued forth in
the two houses of legislature, between which the Senate would represent
the interests of property, the House of Representatives those of per
sons."3

This plan was supported by the large states, because their

populations would outnumber the small and southern states, even if pop
ulation was based nationally.

Fearing for their independent existence,

the small states insisted on a compromise.

Instead of being a "house

of property" the Senate must consist of the "specific, institutional
representation of the states."^

The House of Representatives, under

the auspices of the "Great Compromise", adopted the principle of pro
portional representation.
The great change that emerged out of the Federal Convention was
the reduction of state sovereignty to a subordinate position.

The Arti

cles of Confederation had originally operated under the principle of
dual sovereignty, but this had evolved into a greater emphasis on state
rather than national sovereignty.

The Constitution, it was insisted,

also utilized the principle of dual sovereignty, but the national sover
eignty came to overshadow the states'.

"^I-bid,, p. 87.
^Ibid.

Nevertheless, the corporate
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emphasis of the Confederation was now replaced by personal representa
tion.
. . . the voters who were to be consulted under the Federal
Constitution were to be consulted as persons, -not as owners of
s.pecified amounts of property. Their state governments might
and usually did impose property qualifications, but these were
not the result of anything in the Federal Constitutiono Once
the Federal government was in operation, its electoral system
gave a possibly unintentional but nevertheless an unmistakable
impetus to the idea of political democracy.5
The broad constructionalists got hold of the Constitution early, as can
be evidenced by the change in representation.

They met failure under

the Confederation to institute proportional requisitions according to
the number of inhabitants in the states.

Had broad constructionalists

early taken hold under the Articles of Confederation, would "political
democracy" have had an earlier start?
The American Revolution was fought against general government.
Never being chastised strongly by the Continental Congress, "freedom"
ran rampant.

Restraint is taught only by an old order, or respect for

the new order.

Neither the delegates nor the people were ready for a

stronger government«

The Continental Congress only requested, and did

not utilize its implied power to enforce.
whole people do not consent?

But what use is force if a

To use force then would be to substitute

one arbitrary government for another.

Under the Articles of Confeder

ation government was inefficient and hopelessly in debt.

To this

accusation the Congress, itself, and not the Articles of Confederation,
must stand guilty.

That the delegates failed to put their own house

in order was, perhaps, the cause for the general disorder.

^Ibid., p. 88.

The

88
predilection of the delegates for lengthy discourse did not convert hot
air into steam-driven action.

The role of Congress all too often took

on the tone of henpecked husband rather than master of a household.

All

forms of government must have a beginning and a basis on which to judge
succeeding governments.

Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress

made exploratory incisions into the problems of proportional representa
tion, western lands and taxation.

This, at least, is assured? without

the Articles of Confederation the Federal Convention would have been
like the sinking ship of Mark Twain's story, without any cargo to throw
overboard.
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